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“Nonviolence is a powerful and just weapon, which cuts without wounding and 
ennobles the man who wields it. It is a sword that heals.” 
 
Martin Luther King, Jr., Nobel Lecture, 11 December 1964 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
“Be peaceful, be courteous, obey the law, respect everyone, but if someone puts  
his hands on you, send him to the cemetery.” 
 
Malcolm X, Message to the Grass Roots, 10 November 1963 
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Introduction 
 
In June 1965, US House Representative Jimmy Morrison of Louisiana’s 6th district received a 
letter from a concerned citizen who urgently requested the Justice Department to look into the 
matter of the “Deacons for Defense” in Bogalusa, Louisiana. The letter was written by a 
Louisianan woman who insisted this newly organized “bunch of idiotic Negros” to be 
thoroughly investigated, since they were supposedly in the possession of machine guns and 
hand grenades.1 Little did the woman who wrote the letter know that the FBI had already been 
investigating this so-called defense group since their establishment. In November 1964, a group 
of black men met at a local church in the small paper-mill town of Jonesboro, Louisiana, to 
discuss how to approach attacks from the local Ku Klux Klan. In the wake of several threatening 
events, the men concluded that the only way to protect the black community against vicious 
attacks was to return fire. In order to defend the black community, the men decided to form an 
organization for protection, especially for those advocating civil rights. The most important 
aspect of their organization was the carrying of weapons for self-defense. No member would 
be allowed to use violence as an instigator or for retaliation, but in case of an attack, the Deacons 
would not hesitate to use their guns. Self-defense instantly became the pillar of “The Deacons 
for Defense and Justice.” In the era of the African American struggle for civil rights, news of a 
group of united black men carrying guns spread fear among many, and affected the already 
stirring debate on nonviolence versus self-defense. 
In 1964, the national civil right movement was experiencing its apex. Highly publicized 
protests such as the march on Birmingham demonstrated the continuing racial injustice in the 
Deep South. Even after Congress passed the Civil Rights Act of 1964, the process of integration 
was left up to state legislators, who often refused to enforce the act on a local scale. The 
nonviolent initiatives such as in Birmingham were aimed at confronting such injustices. These 
initiatives are often illustrated as crucial turning points in American history, and display the 
indisputable importance of the nonviolent movement, as Dr. Martin Luther King, Jr. most 
beautifully characterized it. The nonviolent tactics that dominated the movement between 1955 
and 1965 proved to be quite innovative for the black community. Large groups of nonviolent 
black protesters caused a lot of stirring between 1955 and 1965. Unsurprisingly, the entry of 
the slogan “Black Power” into the civil rights movement and the increase in popularity of 
ideologies of black self-defense in 1965 produced even more commotion. Many scholars have 
depicted 1965 and the (re)invention of “Black Power” in the movement as a considerable shift 
between nonviolent activism and self-defensive activism. The creation of the Deacons for 
Defense and Justice is often aligned with the increase in black militancy and black self-defense. 
Most black activist organizations that were formed in alliance with the ideas of black self-
determination were portrayed as threatening and violent by the media in the 60s and 70s. Still 
today, activists and organizations affiliated with the ideology of Black Power are portrayed as 
the violent counterparts of the nonviolent movement, the instigators of the beginning of the end 
of the civil rights movement. Although most scholars still adhere to this narrative, some are 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1 “Urgent Letter, Congressional Liaison Office, Louisiana,” 23 June 1965. In Freedom of Information and 
Privacy Acts. Subject: Deacons for Defense and Justice, File number HQ 157-2466, Federal Bureau of 
Investigation (hereinafter referred to as the FBI Files). 
Page | 7 
 
expanding their research and rediscovering narratives, and the idea of a sharp shift between a 
“nonviolent” era before 1965 and a “violent” era after 1965 is more often contested. 
Furthermore, the exact roles that organizations such as the Deacons played in the civil rights 
movement’s change from nonviolence to self-defense are disputable.2  
The purpose of this study is to determine what role the paramilitary Deacons played in 
the nation-wide repositioning of black self-defense as opposed to nonviolent activism in the 
late 1960s. Scholars who investigated the emergence of Black Power and the increase in black 
militancy during the 1960s sometimes mention the Deacons as an essential factor, whereas 
others simply describe the group as a hoax. These differing stances on the topic show that more 
research of the Deacons is of great importance. Therefore, the question this research will answer 
is what role the Deacons for Defense and Justice played in the development of nonviolent 
disobedience and self-defensive activism between 1964 and 1968. In order to determine the 
significance of the Deacons in the late 1960s’ civil rights movement, especially in respect to 
the emergence of black self-defense and Black Power, it is essential to analyze a variety of 
aspects that were substantial for the creation, the existence, and the eventual fading of the group. 
The first aspect this research will cover is the establishment of the Deacons for Defense 
and Justice. Created in Jonesboro and certified by the State of Louisiana, the Deacons were an 
official Louisiana corporation. However, the organization did not leave many documented 
recordings to indicate the organizational structure and ideological intentions. The only initial 
document, written by the men who established the Deacons in November 1964, is the official 
charter of the group. Accounts from other historians and news-stories will be used alongside 
the official charter to answer how the creation of the Deacons fitted into the development from 
black submission to black self-determination in the South. After the Deacons were created, the 
organization got involved in several events of considerable importance for the civil rights 
struggle in the Deep South. Despite their involvement with nonviolent organizations such as 
the Congress Of Racial Equality (CORE) and the Student Nonviolent Coordinating Committee 
(SNCC), the Deacons sparked a nation-wide response by vocally expressing their commitment 
to self-defense and their use of guns. The group’s local approach and the leaders’ public 
appearances determined the reputation of the group, which is of great importance for a coherent 
analyses of the Deacons’ role within the southern civil rights movement. Therefore, the second 
chapter will cover how Deacon members and leaders influenced a changing sentiment in black 
activist thought. The third and final substantial aspect of this research is the eventual decline of 
the group. An official discontinuation of the Deacons for Defense was never initiated, but 
several sources indicate that the Deacons were discontinued before the 1970s commenced. It is 
crucial to look into the remarkably rapid fading of the Deacons for Defense and Justice. 
Especially because theories of black self-defense and black self-determination rapidly increased 
in popularity and the number of black militant organizations grew substantially during the late 
1960s. Therefore, the final question to answer in order to determine the role of the Deacons is 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
2 “Deacons for Defense and Justice, also known as “The Deacons”, Charles Sims, Spokesman, Racial 
Matters.” Unknown Date, FBI Files; Herbert Shapiro, White Violence and Black Response: From 
Reconstruction to Montgomery (Amherst: University of Massachusetts, 1988). 
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why the self-defensive organization faded away, despite the increasingly important role for 
black self-defense within the civil rights movement.3  
By shedding new light on the establishment and the activities of the Deacons, 
motivations and tactics for the southern struggle for African American equality will be 
reassessed. The official FBI files on the Deacons for Defense and Justice will serve as the 
primary source and the backbone for these insights. These recently published files covering the 
activity of the Deacons for Defense confirm a spread of fear among the American federal 
government. The Bureau increased investigation into black activists who were possibly 
influenced by black nationalist-sentiments and who were likely to pose a problem for the US 
government. The most notorious and sometimes illegal FBI program targeting “black 
extremists” was the Counterintelligence Program, or COINTELPRO, in which the Deacons 
shortly appear. Although the COINTELPRO files do not serve the greater potential of 
answering the research question, they will be used as an indicator of federal concern.4 The files 
on the Deacons, dated between 1964 and 1970, contain several insightful attachments, such as 
letters from concerned white citizens and interviews with former Deacon-members. However, 
the flaws of this primary source should be taken into consideration. The files are incomplete, 
they are not chronologically arranged, they are often unreadable due to erased ink, and most 
importantly; they consist of biased accounts written by FBI agents. Yet although it cannot be 
said that they paint a complete picture of the Deacons, they do offer a crucial inside view. 
Besides the FBI files, several articles from regional and national newspapers will serve as 
indicators for the media attention the Deacons received in the late 1960s. These articles display 
the distribution of information and the accuracy of the portrayed information through the eyes 
of local and national media platforms. Finally, the personal accounts achieved by historian 
Lance Hill in his descriptive and elaborate work on the Deacons will serve as an important 
source of information where other sources are lacking. An important example of these accounts 
is an interview with a former member of the Deacons, which Hill conducted in person. A variety 
of secondary literature will help to structure the thesis into a historically structured research. 
 
Historiography 
The first books on the civil rights movement, written in the 1960s and early 1970s, reflect 
analyses of how the civil rights movement was perceived at the time of its peak. Historians 
from the 1960s and 70s have written about the civil rights movement at a time when a grand 
narrative of the movement had taken hold in popular discourse, which divides the movement 
into two streams, the nonviolent era and the Black Power era. The grand narrative revolves 
around the themes of American idealism, racial struggle and equality, and positions the Black 
Power era as a disruption of the nonviolent movement. Most historians agree that the civil rights 
movement began in the mid-1950s. Originating from the U.S. Supreme Court’s landmark ruling 
against racial segregation in 1964’s Brown v. Board of Education and by the Montgomery Bus 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
3 Roy Reed, “Armed Dixie Negro League is Spreading. 50 Chapters now in 3 States,” Des Moines Sunday 
Register, 6 June 1965, General Section; “Negro ‘Deacons’ Claim They Have Machine Guns, Grenades for 
‘War.” Los Angeles Times, 13 June 1965, in FBI Files. 
4 “Freedom of Information and Privacy Act,” Unknown Date, Subject: Counterintelligence Program, 
Internal Security, Disruption of Hate Group, File number HQ 157-9-33, Federal Bureau of Investigation. 
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Boycott of 1955-1956, when fifty thousand black citizens eventually ended segregated 
transport. The events in Montgomery kicked off a decade of collective action, inspired by the 
charismatic leadership of Martin Luther King, Jr. The movement consisted of a powerful moral 
vision of nonviolent direct action and the goal of an interracial democracy. From Montgomery 
the grand narrative moves forward by a series of events, among which the segregation of Central 
High School in Little Rock, the lunch counter sit-ins, the Freedom Rides, the Birmingham 
campaign, the March on Washington and King’s “I have a dream” speech, and the voting rights 
march from Selma to Montgomery. The wave of protests from the mid-1950s until the mid-
1960s secured several key legislative victories, most importantly the Civil Rights Act of 1964 
and the Voting Rights Act of 1965. In conclusion, the civil rights movement and the 
governmental response succeeded in abolishing legal segregation and granting citizenship 
rights to African Americans.5 
However, the grand narrative indicates that 1965 marked the year when the civil rights 
movement started to unravel with the emergence of militant black nationalist thought, which 
many scholars have defined as the legacy of the in 1965 assassinated Malcolm X. The Black 
Power era brought an end to the nonviolent civil disobedient actions and paved the way for a 
period of social instability and violence. This grand narrative of the civil rights movement is 
common among historians since the late 1960s. Historian Anna Kosof ended her 1989 leading 
study on the civil rights movement with Selma and the Voting Rights Act of 1965, concluding 
that after these events the “moderate wing of the civil rights movement,” represented by Martin 
Luther King, gave way to young militants and their violent ways. According to her “the late 
sixties saw a different kind of civil rights movement.”6 Scholars Brian Ward and Tony Badger 
particularly define the “classic southern civil rights era” as 1955-1965 in their elaborate study 
on King from 1996. The era that followed was a violent and badly organized one.7 In his classic 
study of the civil rights movement (2008), Harvard Sitkoff argues that the year 1965, and the 
Watts riots in particular, was the turning point during which the era of nonviolence ended and 
“the age of Malcolm X’s angry heirs began,” and Kathryn Nastrom explains that the Black 
Power era serves as a “tragic epilogue” to the grand narrative, lacking the moral clarity of the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
5 Nikhil Pal Singh, Black Is a Country: Race and the Unfinished Struggle for Democracy (Cambridge: 
Harvard University Press, 2005), 1-14; Robert O. Self, American Babylon: Race and the Struggle for Postwar 
Oakland (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2003), 10-11; Brian Ward, "Forgotten Wails and Master 
Narratives: Media, Culture, and Memories of the Modern African American Freedom Struggle", in Ward, 
ed., Media, Culture, and the Modern African American Freedom Struggle (Gainesville: University of Florida 
Press, 2001), 8-10; Charles M. Payne, I've Got the Light of Freedom: The Organizing Tradition and the 
Mississippi Freedom Struggle (Oakland: University of California Press, 2007), 3, 391, 413; and Robert 
Korstad and Nelson Lichtenstein, "Opportunities Found and Lost: Labor, Radicals, and the Early Civil Rights 
Movement," The Journal of American History 75 (December 1988), 786-811; Joyce M. Bell, The Black 
Power Movement and American Social Work (New York: Columbia University Press, June 2014). 
 
6 Anna Kosof, The Civil Rights Movement and its Legacy (London: Franklin Watts, 1989), 66. 
7 William T. Martin Riches, The Civil Rights Movement: Struggle and Resistance (New York: Palgrave 
Macmillan, 2010), 86; Brian Ward and Tony Badger, The Making of Martin Luther King and the Civil Rights 
Movement (New York: New York University Press, 1996), 4. 
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earlier movement and without its efficacy.8 The grand narrative has maintained that 
nonviolence shaped and directed the movement until roughly 1965, when the civil rights 
struggle was thrown off course by frustration, impatience, disillusionment, combativeness and 
turned violent. Under this paradigm, a clear duality exists between the pre-1965 nonviolent 
movement and the post-1965 violent movement.  
Recently, scholars have recovered a tradition of Black Nationalism and armed self-
defense that began in the late 1960s.9 According to historian Christopher B. Strain, many 
accounts of the civil rights movement have tended to dichotomize any discussion of the struggle 
for black equality in terms of violence and nonviolence. Questions about the role of armed 
resistance in the civil rights movement are often at the center of movement studies. Scholarly 
interests have shifted over time, raising new questions regarding the need for self-defense, the 
role of white supremacy, and the black identity. Strain explains that it is important to examine 
the mindset of black Americans employing self-defense during the late 1950s and 1960s – 
before the right to armed protection became an assumption by those encouraged by the rhetoric 
of Black Power.10 Furthermore, in his detailed study on the Mississippi Freedom Struggle, 
historian Charles Payne concludes that “very little attention has been paid to the possibility that 
the success of the movement in the rural South owes something to the attitude of local people 
toward self-defense.”11 The importance of local black communities and their attitudes towards 
a strategy of self-defense has often been underestimated, especially in the rural South. Former 
field secretary for the SNCC and journalist Charles E. Cobb, Jr. concluded in his 2014 book on 
the vital link between armed resistance and the survival and liberation of black communities 
that the principled practice of self-defense merged with the civil rights movements’ tactics and 
strategies of nonviolence in the South. He argues that this confluence between armed self-
defense and nonviolent civil disobedience “has often been oversimplified as a clash between 
violent and nonviolent ideas and approaches to civil rights struggle.” But the former SNCC 
field secretary stresses how this oversimplification ignores the more complex tensions between 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
8 Harvard Sitkoff, The Struggle for Black Equality (New York: Hill & Wang, 2008), 185; Kathryn Nastrom, 
“Between Memory and History: Autobiographies of the Civil Rights Movement and Writing of Civil Rights 
History”, The Journal of Southern History 74, No. 2 (May, 2008), 333. 
9 William L. Van Deburg, New Day in Babylon: The Black Power Movement and American Culture, 1965-
1975 (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1992); Akinyele Umoja, “Eye for an Eye: The Role of Armed 
Resistance in the Mississippi Freedom Movement." (Ph.D. dissertation, Emory University, 1996); Timothy 
B. Tyson, Radio Free Dixie: Robert F. Williams and the Roots of Black Power (Chapel Hill: University of 
North Carolina Press, 1999); Lance Hill, The Deacons for Defense (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina 
Press, 2004); Christopher B. Strain, Pure Fire: Self Defense as Activism in the Civil Rights Era (Athens: 
University of Georgia Press, 2005). 
10 Christopher B. Strain, Pure Fire. Self-Defense as Activism in the Civil Rights Era (Athens: University of 
Georgia Press, 2005), 93, 97, 153, 214; Benjamin Muse, The American Negro Revolution: From Nonviolence 
to Black Power, 1963-1967 (Fort Lee: Lyle Stuart, 1968), 242. 
11 Payne, I’ve Got the Light of Freedom, 205. 
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the priorities of local black communities and the priorities of national civil rights organizations 
and activists.12 
An example of complex tensions between local black communities and national 
organizations is displayed throughout the story of the Deacons for Defense and Justice. A rather 
small and often forgotten self-defensive organization, the Deacons present a story of rural black 
communities and their attitudes toward the local civil rights struggle. The emergence of the 
Deacons in 1964-65, was soon overshadowed by Black Power nationalists such as the Black 
Panther Party, which is still noticeable in Deacon historiography. The historiographical debate 
on the Deacons for Defense and Justice lacks the extensive scope into the complexity of self-
defense versus nonviolence, especially in comparison to other self-defensive organizations that 
erupted in the late 1960’s. Nevertheless, several recent studies have provided us with extensive 
research on the Louisiana-originated Deacons. Historian Lance Hill’s principal research on the 
creation and the impact of the Deacons for Defense contains an impressive amount of insights 
and places the organization into the wider scope of the national civil rights movement. 
Especially the Bogalusa chapter of the Deacons played an important role, according to Hill. 
The African American author, who has been active in civil rights activism himself, has 
interviewed several of the former members of the Deacons and speaks of the organization with 
great adoration. He argues that the Deacons inspired pride in the community and had “proved 
to be a natural instrument for building community feeling and nourishing the Negro identity.”  
 Historians who wrote on the Deacons in an earlier stage, for example Benjamin Muse 
in his 1968 book on The American Negro Revolution, do not include the Deacons as a positive 
aspect of the civil rights movement. Muse emphasizes that although Deacons patrolled the 
headquarters of CORE in Jonesboro and Bogalusa, CORE officials and other civil-rights leaders 
avoided identification with the group, their methods were not endorsed.13 Muse argues that the 
Deacons’ philosophy was a harbinger of “a large element of impatient, sullen Negroes […] who 
were united only by a common infection with the thing called Black Power.” Such “sullen 
negroes” met here and there with extremist groups or simply on the ghetto street and were 
mostly unorganized.14 Muse’s book from 1968 was written in the heyday of the Black Power 
era, and reflects the author’s personal feelings of aversion at the time. His work functions as a 
valuable source for learning about the perception of the Deacons and the Black Power era at 
the time. In other earlier works on self-defense in black activism, the Deacons are barely 
mentioned. Clayborne Carson’s book on the SNCC In Struggle, originated from 1981, only 
quickly mentions the Deacons once as “a Louisiana based defense group.”15 The same is true 
for historian Adam Fairclough’s 1987 book on the SNCC and Martin Luther King, Jr.16 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
12 Charles E. Cobb, Jr., This Nonviolent Stuff’ll Get You Killed. How Guns Made the Civil Rights Movement 
Possible (Duke University Press, June 2014), 122-123. 
13 Muse, The American Negro Revolution, 166. 
14 Idem, 233, 277. 
15 Clayborne Carson, In Struggle: SNCC and the Black Awakening of the 1960s (Cambridge: Harvard 
University Press, 1981), 164. 
16 Adam Fairclough, To Redeem the Soul of America: The Southern Christian Leadership Conference & 
Martin Luther King, Jr. (University of Georgia Press, 1987). 
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Over time however, historians tended to pay more attention to the Deacons while writing 
on self-defense. Even those who previously inclined to do so. For example, in Fairclough’s 
more recent study on the civil rights movement in Louisiana, he extensively covers the 
Deacons’ role in the Louisianan struggle. He concludes his coverage of the Deacons by stating 
that the Bogalusa movement represented a new level of black militancy. However, Fairclough 
argues the Deacons turned out to be a “gigantic hoax”, far less important than seemed at first. 
Contrary to exaggerated press reports, the Deacons never grew into a large, statewide 
organization, Fairclough emphasizes.17 Historian Simon Wendt is also more critical of the 
importance of the Deacons in his 2007 book on armed resistance in the civil rights struggle. He 
argues that the Deacons did not assume organizational breadth and political influence, like 
Lance Hill claims in his work. “But”, recalls Wendt, “neither was the defense organization what 
Adam Fairclough has called a ‘gigantic hoax’,” because potentially exaggerated numbers and 
the failure to establish a nation-wide organization do not diminish the significance of the 
Deacons.18 Historians Charles Payne and Christopher Strain have both separately argued that it 
is crucial to examine African American self-defense in the 1960s while paying great attention 
to the role and attitude of local people toward armed resistance. Perhaps most important for this 
study will be to research the determination of the rural southern black communities in Louisiana 
to obtain their autonomy over their own lives, and in what way the Deacons represented this 
determination by self-defensive organizing. 19 
  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
17 Adam Fairclough, Race & Democracy: The Civil Rights Struggle in Louisiana, 1915-1972 (University of 
Georgia Press, 1999), 3. 
18 Simon Wendt, The Spirit and the Shotgun. Armed Resistance and the Struggle for Civil Rights (University 
Press of Florida, 2007), 93-94. 
19 Payne, I’ve Got The Light, 205; Strain, Pure Fire, 1-7. 
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1 ‘By any and all honorable and legal means’ 
1964 was a year of great importance for the African American civil rights movement in the 
United States. The Civil Rights Act of 1964 was celebrated as a great success of the nonviolent 
strategy, led by the reverent Martin Luther King, Jr. However, as the year proceeded, the results 
of the Civil Rights Act proved to be disappointing throughout the South. National media 
attention for dramatic events such as the bloody protests in Selma, displayed to the nation how 
southern segregation was kept in place through intimidation and violence. In many other rural 
southern areas segregation remained unchanged as well. Until local black communities decided 
to take matters into their own hands. The events leading up to the creation of the Deacons in 
1964 are crucial for understanding how the organization fitted into the national changes of 
nonviolent activism and self-defense. 
 
The Freedom Summer 
In June of 1964, CORE launched a new civil rights campaign in the Deep South. CORE dubbed 
the new campaign the Freedom Summer, named after the famous 1961 Mississippi Freedom 
Riders who rode interstate buses to challenge segregation. After the success of nonviolent 
disobedient actions, such as the Montgomery bus-boycott, CORE was determined to challenge 
southern segregation head on, starting with voter disenfranchisement. In an attempt to register 
as many African American voters as possible, over a thousand out-of-state volunteers 
participated in the Freedom Summer alongside thousands of black Mississippians and 
Louisianans. When the Freedom Summer was launched in 1964, the national consensus of the 
five most influential civil rights organizations; the National Association for the Advancement 
of Colored People (NAACP), The National Urban League (NUL), the Southern Christian 
Leadership Conference (SCLC), CORE, and SNCC, was that voter registration was the primary 
need in the South and should be the primary focus of civil rights campaigns. All five 
organizations agreed on the importance of nonviolent civil disobedience as a means to challenge 
segregation, and all the organizations nationally voiced their support of the non-violent 
approach.20  
The strategy of nonviolent direct action in the South was relatively new and widely 
adopted by the national civil rights movement. Nonviolent actions brought young people into 
an older tradition of community organizing. As the organizations grew, the nonviolent direct 
actions rapidly moved SNCC and CORE into grassroots efforts to expand black voter 
registration throughout the South. However, grassroots organizations mostly consisted of 
northern young people who were willing to adapt the ideology of nonviolence as a way of life. 
For older generations of black southerners, this ideology was more difficult to adapt. As the 
Kennedy administration continued to press student activists to abandon direct-action protests 
and work on voter registration instead, segregation in the Deep South barely changed in the 
first years of the 1960s. Furthermore, white southerners responded with anger to the expanding 
of civil rights organizations throughout the South. 21 
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White vigilante violence showed itself through kidnappings, assassinations and 
bombings of Freedom Summer activists and local blacks associated with the movement. The 
region’s Ku Klux Klan membership rose as civil rights activism increased. Hooded white men 
burned crosses throughout the states to intimidate those who dared to challenge the white-power 
structure. 22 Throughout the South, Klan members openly advocated to keep segregation in 
place. Klan rallies were organized more often, during which Klan leaders declared that “the 
nigger is not a human being”, and should not be treated as such.23 Hidden under white ropes, 
local racists terrorized the black neighborhoods. Most of the southern white response to the 
Freedom Summer consisted of fear, hypocrisy and anger, which was characterized by blaming 
Northern volunteers as outside agitators for increasing public discontent and escalating 
protests.24 That sentiment among white southerners did not only exist in rural communities. 
Many high-ranking state –and federal officials publicly voiced their discontent with black 
activists, most vocally being FBI director Edgar J. Hoover, who mistrusted the civil rights 
movement for being too communist. As the civil rights movement progressed in the 1960s, 
Hoover targeted activists such as Martin Luther King, Jr., Malcolm X, the Black Panther Party 
and the Deacons for Defense and Justice for investigation through COINTELPRO. 25 The 
federal government did not provide any protection for the Freedom Summer activists in 
Mississippi and Louisiana in 1964. 
 A few days after the Freedom Summer was launched, the crucial consequences of white 
vigilante violence were revealed when Klansmen in Philadelphia, Mississippi murdered three 
CORE activists. The case, known as the Mississippi Burning murders, caused national outrage 
and media coverage. Although the effect the Klan’s terror had on the daily lives of black 
southerners was nationally known, the murders stood out because of the national attention for 
the Freedom Summer. Especially when official released that two of the murdered men were 
white volunteers from the North. Promoting civil rights in the South was not only dangerous to 
blacks; white volunteers were not spared by the Klan’s terror-tactics either. The media attention 
forced Hoover into an extensive investigation, and pressured the federal government into 
sending the National Guard for a search-operation. The bodies of the three men were found, 
buried in an old dam. Over twenty white local Mississippians were initially suspected of 
murder, one of whom was the County Sheriff. But local officials hindered the prosecution and 
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refused to prosecute any of the men for murder. During the search for the three men, the bodies 
of eight other black Mississippians were found, including the body of a fourteen-year-old boy.26  
The murdered activists, the discovery of several other bodies, and the involvement of 
local authorities represented a common, distressing phenomenon throughout the Deep South. 
White southerners killing black southerners was common, without consequences and often even 
involved state officials. In most cases no one was arrested, let alone convicted, and the daily 
threat of discrimination and violent oppression proceeded. In the development of the 
Mississippi Burning murders, justice never came. However, the outrage over the murders 
caused a lot of pressure on the Johnson administration to act on civil rights. The media pressure 
eventually played a motivating role for the Johnson administration to sign the Civil Rights Act 
of 1964. The Act, which was signed in presence of Martin Luther King, Jr., was seen as a great 
win for black civil rights, and illegalized segregation and discrimination throughout the 
country.27 At the same time, the outrage over the murders and the unwillingness of the federal 
government to provide protection increased a new regional sentiment among the black 
population in the South. Black southern men and women were fed up with injustice and fear. 
The murders fueled the need for protection and self-defense. 
 
The Jonesboro Deacons 
CORE’s Freedom Summer project targeted small rural towns in Mississippi and Louisiana, in 
an effort to win over the minds of local black communities for the cause of integration. 
Jonesboro was one of those towns. A small paper mill town, Jonesboro was located in the 
Northern area of Jackson Parish, Louisiana. The town had a population of approximately four 
thousand, one third of which was black. The black neighborhood in Jonesboro; “The Quarters”, 
covered a substantial part of the town. In Jonesboro, African Americans were used to struggling 
with white supremacy and racism, and the local Klan chapter was substantial. When CORE 
arrived, the increase in threatening attacks by the local Ku Klux Klan was no different from any 
other southern town. While CORE was organizing more anti-segregation protests, tensions 
between the white and black neighborhood enlarged. It was not unusual for local Klansmen to 
form a caravan of cars and drive through town in white hoods and ropes to taunt and scare the 
black population. Anti-segregation picket-lines and sit-ins were violently disrupted by groups 
of white aggressors who relentlessly targeted the protesters, even women and children.28 And 
consequently, none of the white assaulters were ever punished for their deeds by local law 
enforcement. With CORE coming to Jonesboro, white harassment accumulated and the activists 
soon realized that their objectives of reducing voter disenfranchisement might not be achieved. 
In this town, like in many others, the black population was not able to register to vote, simply 
because that would be a life-threatening activity. CORE’s nonviolent voter registration project 
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only seemed to target a small aspect of the discrimination in southern towns such as Jonesboro, 
where the black population faced harassment and feared life threatening attacks every day.29 
 Many southern blacks, especially in rural communities, felt alone and isolated. There 
really was no substantive white support for the black freedom struggle. Although the white-
supremacist system of the old South was weakening because of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, it 
was still in place. However, black southerners were increasingly unwilling to submit to white 
supremacy, socially or politically. The risk of white violence was already in the lives of many, 
and rural black communities had learned how to minimize the risk of white terror long before 
the existence of organizations such as CORE. Therefore, in the rural South, nonviolent direct-
action was not popular among the rural black community. When CORE got involved in the 
Deep South, the organization encountered the reality of white vigilante violence. The violent 
encounters with vigilante groups such as the Klan, and the unwillingness of the local law 
enforcement to provide protection for black activists displayed a crucial limitation of the 
nonviolent approach in practice and in idea. A nonviolent approach would not have the same 
results in rural Klan-dominated areas as it had in the southern cities.30 
 The increase in violent attacks after CORE’s arrival initiated several prominent black 
citizens of Jonesboro to collectively discuss ways of protection. One of the men was local high 
school teacher Frederick Douglas Fitzpatrick, who proposed the idea of a black auxiliary police 
unit that would be officially sanctioned, providing legitimacy and respect in Jonesboro. This 
unit would help the regular police forces to monitor Klan-activity in the Quarters. Another man, 
most vocal, was father of three and war veteran Earnest Thomas. Thomas argued a police unit 
would not have enough autonomy and legitimacy to make a difference for the black community 
and proposed to organize an unofficial defense group instead. However, everyone ultimately 
supported the idea of a black police unit and the black community was pleasantly surprised 
when the local authorities permitted the formation of the police squad. Several local citizens 
were appointed to join the unit by the summer of 1964, including Fitzpatrick. The police officers 
patrolled the Quarters and the residents of Freedom Summer activists, and observed the 
movements of the KKK.31 
As the summer of 1964 was proceeding, the community observed in frustration how the 
black police unit was used as a tool for the town’s white power structure to neutralize civil 
rights protests. On July 29, 1964, a group of young CORE protesters and local citizens entered 
a segregated cafeteria in downtown Jonesboro. Encouraged by the Civil Rights Act, the group 
of black protesters demanded to be served, but the restaurant owner refused. After a short 
standoff, several black officers were sent to the scene and ordered the black protesters to leave. 
The police department made convenient use of the black unit to break up civil rights protest in 
an effort to control the movement. Thomas would later recall; “They were looking for some 
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black policemen to do their dirty work”.32 Police actions such as in the café happened again at 
multiple other occasions that week. Black protesters who imposed an inconvenience for the 
local white authorities were of inconsequential meaning to those white authorities, and when 
such an inconvenience occurred, the equally unimportant black police unit was sent in to shut 
down the commotion. Local officials did not provide any protection to civil rights activists, but 
instead were engaging in the oppression of those who advocated black civil rights. Even by 
using the black police unit to dismantle local activists who tried to enforce the Civil Rights 
Act.33 
  As July came to an end, one event changed the future of Jonesboro. On a hot summer 
evening, the electricity to the Quarters of town was suddenly shut off and dozens of men dressed 
in white hoods and cloaks drove through the black neighborhood. In front of the Klan-convoy 
was the police car of the local deputy sheriff, who personally escorted the caravan through the 
Quarters. While yelling racist taunts, the hooded men tossed pamphlets onto the streets, warning 
blacks to stay away from CORE and the civil rights movement.34 The intention of this night of 
terror was to intimidate the black community into submission to the white power structure of 
segregation. The Klansmen intended to scare locals from engaging in any form of civil rights 
activism. Instead, this moment of Klan-terror became a crucial turning-point, by which 
Klansmen provoked the black community and instigated a response they never expected.35 
 It had only been one month since CORE launched the Freedom Summer, and white 
terror soared throughout Mississippi and Louisiana. But the black community of Jonesboro was 
tired of being subjected to vigilante Klan-violence and police injustice. Within several days of 
the Klan’s night of terror, a group of approximately twenty black men, many of whom were 
members of the black police unit, gathered again. This time to discuss forming a group besides 
the black police squad, to defend the Quarters from white attacks. The most pressing item on 
the minds of the men was to arrange armed patrols around the neighborhood. Fitzgerald and 
Thomas now both called for an armed self-defensive squad besides the police unit. Thomas 
raised the issue that black men did not just want to protect their families, but that they were sick 
and tired of the white myths of black male powerlessness. The relationship between non-
violence, violence, and black manhood in the civil rights struggle has often been examined. 
According to Christopher B. Strain, the definition of what it meant to be a man implied an 
obligation to defend black women and children against racist attacks. This definition challenged 
the movement’s non-violent strategy of submission, and is part of the reason why the non-
violent protests failed to attract large numbers of black men. Often African American men did 
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not participate, because they worried they would not be able to restrain from defending women 
or children being attacked.36  
In Jonesboro, a group of black men decided to contradict the national civil rights 
movement’s strategy of strict nonviolence. An armed defensive squad was formed that 
sharpened security measures and escorted CORE workers while registering voters. At the same 
time, the black police unit continued to patrol the Quarters. When white harassers drove into 
the black neighborhood, the armed men drove them out. Although single volunteers had carried 
out these activities before, the security was now better organized. When the Jonesboro Deputy 
Chief decided to dismantle the black police unit in October 1965, the black community was 
startled at first, but soon turned to the newly created group of armed men for protection. During 
another meeting on a cold Tuesday night in November, members of the black community 
discussed the extension of the self-defense group, now that the black police unit was 
discontinued. Before the dismantling of the black police unit, the defensive group had simply 
been an extra patrolling security measure. However, on that evening, the group of men decided 
to become its own movement, not a secret auxiliary to protect the nonviolent movement. The 
defense group and the veterans of the black police unit coalesced into one organization 
committed to armed self-defense; the Deacons for Defense and Justice. An informant would 
later tell the FBI that the primary catalyst for the creation of the Deacons was the town 
government’s decision to disband the black police unit.37 
By the end of November 1964, the Deacons for Defense and Justice were patrolling 
through Jonesboro on a regular basis. Chosen as the Deacons’ president was local resident Percy 
Lee Bradford, whereas Earnest Thomas filled the position of vice president. Kirkpatrick 
remained an important member and spokesperson. Equipped with walkie-talkies and citizen 
band radios, armed men guarded the Quarters. The equipment served to monitor Klan action, 
and gave the Deacons the advantage of preparing for potential assaults. The group was ready 
to defend the black community and would return fire if necessary. The black southern men who 
were forced to defend activists by means of armed resistance, were proud of their ability to 
protect themselves and the community. They regarded armed resistance as an assertion of black 
manhood. 
 
More Than a Protective Squad 
The Deacons started off as quite a clandestine organization. Jonesboro locals, state CORE 
members, and law officials were aware of their existence, but the group remained relatively 
anonymous. According to Lance Hill, they regarded themselves as merely the defensive arm of 
public civil rights organizations such as CORE. The best way to protect their membership was 
to adhere to secrecy.38 However, it did not take long for the FBI to notice the organization in 
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early January of 1965. On January 6, the first message concerning the Deacons for Defense and 
Justice was sent to FBI director J. Edgar Hoover from the New Orleans office. New Orleans 
agents informed the director about the creation of an organization that “has for its purposes 
much the same as those of CORE […], but that captioned organization is more militant than 
CORE and that it would be more inclined to use violence in dealing with any violent opposition 
encountered in Civil Rights Matters.” The day before the first message was sent to the FBI, 
Percy Lee Bradford, president of the Deacons for Defense and Justice, cooperated with FBI 
officials and agreed to an interview about the intentions of the armed squad. It appears he was 
willing to provide important information to the FBI, as he brought up names of individuals who 
were leading the Deacons, gave an estimation on the number of members, and informed the 
officials about the equipment that was being used. During the interview, Bradford emphasized 
the DDJ’s purpose to be much the same as those of CORE, “except its members would, if 
attacked, defend themselves by use of force”. 39 Furthermore, he expressed the hope that the 
Deacons would not be necessary for long. He even believed that if things would change and the 
black community would be safe, the Deacons would be able to disband within a couple of years. 
Bradford’s interview on January 5 was the first time the Deacons’ self-defensive 
philosophy was explained by a member. Significantly, the Deacons did not have any written 
statement of purpose expressing their goals and strategy yet. At this point, the organization was 
simply created through oral agreement between local black men, called into existence through 
the necessity of protection against threat. As Hill puts it: “The KKK had left little time to 
contemplate organizational philosophy.”40 During the interview, Bradford was clearly cautious 
with his explanation of the Deacons’ strategy. He emphasized the similarities between CORE’s 
strategy of nonviolence and the Deacons’ loyalty towards the nonviolent approach. He 
repeatedly assured the officials the organization was “a non-violent Negro movement.” But 
despite the continuing emphasis on the similarities between the approaches of CORE and the 
Deacons, the differences were more striking and clearly of more interest to the federal agents 
who reported the interview. Behind every sentence that described Bradford emphasizing the 
Deacons’ similarities to CORE and the inherited belief in nonviolence, the possible use of 
armed self-defense was highlighted. Bradford was clearly struggling as he tried to distinguish 
the Deacons from vigilante organizations, while he also attempted to emphasize the importance 
of self-defensive action. The president of the brand-new Deacons tried to merge the philosophy 
of self-defense with the strategy of nonviolence. A difficult reconciliation, which turned out to 
be difficult throughout the national civil rights movement after 1964. Bradford was trying to 
reassure the agents of a non-threatening inheritance, but the Bureau was not convinced after his 
explanation. Upon reading the interview, the FBI headquarters ordered more intensive research 
into the Deacons’ members, ideology and most importantly, the organization’s activities.41 
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An official charter of the Deacons for Defense and Justice was created on March 5, 
1965. The charter was written by the Deacons’ Board of Members, which consisted of Bradford 
as the president and Thomas as vice-president, besides secretary Charlie White, treasurer 
Cosetta Jackson, and agent Elmo Jacobs.42 On March 9, the charter was officially certified by 
the Secretary of State of the state of Louisiana. The charter declared that all future chapters 
would have to be channeled into the headquarters in Jonesboro. The main purposes of the new 
organization were described as educating local citizens of the United States and especially 
minority groups in (1) the principals of the republican form of government and the democratic 
way of life, (2) the provisions of the constitutional laws of the United States and the State of 
Louisiana, (3) the use, value and purpose of the ballot, and (4) the value of economic security.43 
But more importantly, the charter of the Deacons read that:  
 
This corporation has for its further purpose, and is dedicated to, the defense of the civil 
rights, property rights and personal rights […] and will defend said rights by any and 
all honorable and legal means to the end that justice may be obtained.44 
 
In the official charter, the objective of the Deacons for Defense and Justice is described as the 
dedication to the proposition of protecting the rights granted by appropriate law to all Citizens 
of the United States of America, implicitly appealing to the Civil Rights Act of 1964. The Board 
of Members avoided the term self-defense while writing the official charter, just like it 
deliberately never mentioned the use of weapons as a means of defense. It is, however, implied 
that the civil, -property and –personal rights of the local community should be defended through 
any means necessary, including the use of arms. The charter fits into the narrative of the 
mainstream civil rights movement and Bradford’s efforts to reconcile armed resistance with 
nonviolence. The Board of Members decided to describe this reconciliation of two opposite 
strategies in an implicit manner, by not explicitly using the words armed self-defense. The 
explanation for the implicit language is self-evident. Many civil rights leaders criticized armed 
self-defense, while most of the national organizations supported nonviolent direct action. King 
and the nonviolent leaders feared that defensive action would be too close to aggressive 
violence. Anyhow, African Americans arming themselves had to be cautious, especially in 
relation to the national civil rights movement. Any form of aggression against white citizens or 
government officials posed the risk of alienating (white) allies of the movement, which was the 
biggest fear of organizations such as King’s SCLC and the NAACP. Black display of force 
could also cause a violent response by white vigilantes and law enforcement.45 The Jonesboro 
Deacons tried their best to reconcile self-defense and nonviolence in the official charter and left 
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out any language that indicated violence. Consequently, the charter does not reflect the actual 
purposes of the organized men who called themselves the Deacons for Defense and Justice. 
The organization’s name reflects a desire to identify with respected symbols of the black 
community, but also affirms a paradox. The Christian term “Deacon” was associated with 
respected authority, peace and morality, whereas “Defense” was often interpreted as a symbol 
of militancy. In its name, the Deacons combined Christian pacifism with self-defensive 
violence. The organization was merging the black community with CORE nonviolent civil 
rights efforts in the Deep South. They were not the first black men to advocate armed self-
defense, but they were the first southern civil rights organization to advocate it. More 
importantly, the Deacons were unique in holding the autonomy over their organization through 
local establishment and all-black control. Roughly all major civil rights organizations consisted 
of a mixed membership of blacks and whites, whereas the Jonesboro organization was made up 
of only African American men. Furthermore, most organizations depended on white financial 
support. The Deacons’ financial revenue consisted solely of the membership-payments, which 
meant the organization had no substantial monetary supply. It did mean, however, that the 
Deacons would not have to rely on white support in fear of losing financial assistance. This 
form of self-sustainment was an important first step toward improving black autonomy in the 
rural south. 46 
 
Jackson High 
The Deacons’ strategy of secrecy changed on February 21, 1965. In the Sunday edition of the 
New York Times, reporter Fred Powledge published an article headlined “Armed Negroes Make 
Jonesboro Unusual Town.” The article painted a sympathetic picture of the Deacons in 
Jonesboro. Powledge wrote about Jonesboro as a regular southern town, untouched by civil 
rights legislation such as the Civil Rights Act of 1964. Public places remained segregated, the 
KKK was spreading fear and terror, and African Americans were still expected to step off a 
side-walk when whites passed by. But, Powledge emphasized, in this town the black community 
initiated to form a protective association. The article focused mainly on the defensive 
philosophy of the Deacons, characterizing them as a protecting force against white terror.47 
Powledge’s article gave the Deacons some regional attention, but the new self-defense 
organization was still relatively unknown, especially when the media’s attention turned to the 
unfolding drama in Selma in March 1965, where nonviolent protesters led by King were 
attacked by southern law enforcement. Regionally however, the Deacons were establishing a 
name, and that name was causing trouble for some of the members. In Jonesboro, Deacon 
Kirkpatrick was working as a sports coach at the black Jackson High School, when rumors 
started to circle about his supposed dismissal. The rumors implied that the all-white Jackson 
High School Board was firing him from his position, due to his associations with the Deacons 
and his activity in civil rights activism. Once the rumors of Kirkpatrick’s possible dismissal 
spread, black students walked out of class in anger and joined for protests and demonstrations 
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in front of the school. The walkout quickly grew beyond the issue of Kirkpatrick’s rumored 
discharge. Within days, the protest developed into a comprehensive school boycott.48 
 A report from the Deacons FBI file, dated March 19, 1965, reads that, “[the Jackson 
High school boycott] involves Negroes protesting and demonstrating as result of rumor that 
high school coach Kirkpatrick reported action in recent civil rights activity was to be dismissed 
from position. Some indication that Deacons for Defense and Justice might be involved- in 
violence in connection with this action”.49 The rumors of Kirkpatrick’s dismissal accelerated 
the Jonesboro civil rights struggle, which had already intensified with the establishment of the 
Deacons. The black community was aggravated with the School Board, who supposedly wanted 
to punish a teacher for participating in the civil rights struggle. At first sight, the boycott seemed 
one of many demands for equality in the South, but there was a striking difference. While 
protesters elsewhere were seeking equality through integration, like during the Chicago school 
boycott of 1963, the Jackson High School demonstrators demanded equality through other 
means. Not integration, but the control of black institutions and the demand of equal resources 
within a segregated system were the proposed means to an end at Jackson High. The demand 
for control of black institutions by the black community was a demand for black autonomy, 
which correlated closely to the all-black control the Deacons had over their organization. It 
certainly was no coincidence that the protesting students at Jackson High were demanding black 
autonomy in the same town where the all-black self-defensive civil rights organizations was 
established, and it did not take long for the Deacons to get involved.50 
With assistance from local activists and other adults, the Jackson High students made a 
list of demands to present to the School Board. Most of those demands concerned the unequal 
distribution of resources. As a response to the demands, the Board promised to meet with the 
protestors on March 22, but only if the students were to discontinue their demonstrations and 
return to class. At this point, the president and vice president of the Deacons, Bradford and 
Thomas, openly spoke out against the proposal of the Board and urged the students to continue 
demonstrating. They argued that the boycott was the only leverage the black community had to 
enforce their demands.51 When the protests did not end, despite a strategy of harassment by the 
local sheriff’s department, the School Board decided to close the school and use more desperate 
measures to break up the students. In a CORE summary of events, a description of March 11 
portrays how the students returned to the school to demonstrate, when local police officers 
blocked the passage between the school and the Quarters. The students were completely closed 
off from the black community. Within minutes, several fire trucks arrived and firemen began 
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unloading the hoses, which suggested the Jonesboro law enforcement was willing to take 
violent measures comparable to those taken by authorities in Selma. The Jonesboro Deacons, 
who learned about the unfolding danger, were restrained by the blockade and desperately began 
to search for entry points to reach the students. When the Deacons tried to pass the blockade 
they were hindered by groups of deputized white locals and policemen. Several members were 
arrested for a variety of reasons, but the armed Deacons remained persistent and refused to 
leave until the blockade was lifted. The blockade lasted from nine in the morning until three in 
the afternoon. Luckily, the police actions against the students did not turn violent. 52  
What would have happened if the police had assaulted the students can only be guessed. 
It would have been imaginable for the Deacons to respond with violence to any police assault 
against the students. Presumably, the prospect of being attacked by an organized group of black 
men influenced the police decision to act without violence.  The boycott came to national 
attention during an ABC news program, when CORE Director James Farmer announced that 
the Freedom Summer campaigns in Jonesboro and other small Louisianan towns would be the 
primary focus of CORE’s Freedom Summer.53 In the meantime, federal officials grew more 
concerned that the campaign of harassment by the local police force in Jonesboro would 
instigate an uncontrollable situation, or even a race-war. On March 24, 1965, a teletype was 
sent from the New Orleans office to inform the bureau of “a volatile racial situation and 
indication that the Deacons may be involved”.54 The Jackson high boycott eventually dissolved 
without any crucial solutions, and the matter soon faded away.  
However, the school boycott had displayed a decisive shift in black southern thought. 
A broad consensus of growing disappointment and aggravation stimulated the need for self-
determination among the black southern population. According to Hill, this development made 
the creation of a black militant organization such as the Deacons inevitable.55 Within this new 
consensus, a group of black men decided to become its own movement. Strengthened by an all-
black control over their own movement and stimulated by the black community’s support, the 
newly established Deacons demanded the autonomy over their own community by providing 
protection. The Deacons’ display of autonomy encouraged others from the black community to 
demand the same. The Jackson High boycott demonstrated how the broader consensus of black 
self-determination initiated by the Deacons spread throughout the community. 
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2 ‘Rather be caught with a weapon than without one’  
 
The Deacons were becoming an integral part of the black community in Jonesboro. In the Times 
article of February 1964, Powledge described how the presence of the organization “kept 
Jonesboro from developing into a civil rights battleground”, and how the organization 
discouraged local police from brutalizing activists. On several occasions, the Deacons showed 
up when local black citizens were threatened by Klan-members, and prevented the situation 
from escalating. Deacon members and leaders were positioning the organization within the 
realm of southern civil rights activism, and started to actively look for ways to expand. Within 
weeks, another chapter was established in Bogalusa, Louisiana, and plans for Northern 
extensions were enunciated. Black activists from throughout the nation learned of the existence 
of the Deacons. During an already existing shift in black activist thought, the entrance of the 
Deacons on a national platform was sure to cause an effect. 
 
The Bogalusa Chapter 
On February 21, 1965, besides the appearance of Powledge’s article had appeared in the New 
York Times, another crucial event took place. On the evening of the twenty-first, several 
Deacons traveled to the small town of Bogalusa, Louisiana, about 200 miles from Jonesboro. 
They were asked to join in a meeting with Bogalusa leaders, held at the black neighborhoods’ 
labor hall. Organizer of the meeting was Robert Hicks, a vocal African American civil rights 
activist who led the Bogalusa Voters and Civil League (BVCL) in town. The purpose of the 
meeting was to discuss the development of a Bogalusa chapter of “an organization now being 
put together in Louisiana known as the Deacons for Defense and Justice.” Bogalusa was another 
typical Louisianan town, where integration was far from enacted. Police harassment and Klan-
terror were part of every-day life in the black community, and unsurprisingly, the Deacons’ 
philosophy of self-defense was well received there. The main speaker of the evening was 
Earnest Thomas. He discussed the importance of black men defending themselves against white 
violence. Thomas explained how the Deacons “intended to combat violence with violence; that 
they had no intention of starting anything themselves but wanted to be ready.” His confident 
remarks were praised with an applause from the audience. 56 
He proposed to create a chapter in Bogalusa and explained how a Deacon chapter would 
improve the current situation of Klan-violence and discrimination. Thomas firmly stressed that 
all future local chapters would be channeled into the headquarters in Jonesboro, and he 
described how membership-payments would facilitate the purchase of radio equipment, 
ammunition, literature and more. The Deacons intended to establish a code system through 
which state wide communication could be created, which would help in case African Americans 
in one community were having difficulties and were in need for assistance. Thomas criticized 
the tendency of the black community to buy cheap weapons and pointed out that the purchase 
of substantial weapons was important, and everyone had to keep plenty of ammunition in cars 
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and homes. The Jonesboro vice president quickly mentioned he was in contact with groups in 
Chicago and Houston for the purchase of automatic weapons and explained at great length the 
advantages of having roving patrols in the various communities. According to Thomas, once 
police officers noticed that black men were armed, they were more likely to back away.57 
The meeting was a great success for the Deacons, and the procedures for establishing a 
Bogalusa chapter started that night. The Deacons were expanding. Bogalusa resident Charles 
Sims was chosen as president of the Bogalusa chapter and Royan Burris as vice president. Sims 
was a veteran of World War II and was known as a though man. His opinions on armed self-
defense were very much in line with those of Jonesboro vice president Thomas. The man who 
had arranged the meeting on the twenty-first, Robert Hicks, did not serve as a member or officer 
in the Bogalusa chapter. However, Hicks and A.Z. Young, another BVCL leader, were heavily 
involved with the activities of the Deacons and often acted as spokespersons for them. Even 
some of the expenses of the Bogalusa chapter were reimbursed by the BVCL. As a result, 
Charles Sims was made financial secretary for the BVCL.58 
In Bogalusa, the Deacons’ chapter started off in roughly the same pattern as the 
Jonesboro chapter had. Bogalusa was part of Washington Parish, and in 1965 the Parish’s 
Sheriff’s department employed its first black deputy sheriffs, among other black police officers. 
When CORE came to Bogalusa, activists were terrorized by Klansmen, and the black 
community was not able to protect them. Local African Americans who got involved with civil 
rights activism received death threats by phone and were chased by carloads of hooded men. 
But the newly established Deacon chapter started to patrol the black community, in addition to 
the black officers. Robert Hicks soon announced that white citizens would no longer be allowed 
to enter the black community at night. In response, the Klan intensified its exertion of terror 
over the next few months, which reached a climax on June 2, 1965. Black deputy sheriffs 
O’Neal Moore and Creed Rogers had just finished their shift and were driving home, when their 
car was attacked by a Klansman in a pickup truck. The man shot at the black officers, instantly 
killing Moore and severely injuring Rogers. Rogers was able to give a description of the truck 
and the driver, and several arrests were made at first. But unsurprisingly, no one was ever 
charged for the murder.59 The murder worsened the already tense situation in Washington 
Parish. Several local black leaders spoke out against the situation and expressed their support 
for the Deacons, who guarded the homes of activists and the Moore widow. CORE leader James 
Farmer promised to speak at Moore’s funeral on June 9, and openly applauded the Deacons for 
the offered protection.  
Meanwhile, several FBI agents who reported the events pointed out a crucial question 
for national civil rights organizations as advocates of nonviolence. “Should a civil rights 
organization committed to nonviolence align itself with the Deacons and accept its services, as 
one organization (CORE) has done?”60 In the wake of the O’Neal murder, Earnest Thomas 
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visited Bogalusa too, and was interviewed by an unknown FBI agent. He explained that the 
connection between CORE and the Deacons began accidentally in Jonesboro when CORE 
discovered that its workers were safer with the Deacons around.61 He explained how one of 
their many jobs was to protect civil rights workers and volunteers participating in civil rights 
activities. “A person who walks a picket line knowingly exposes himself to white violence, but 
when at night he is entitled to rest without worry and that’s where the Deacons come in.”62 But 
the collaboration between CORE and the Deacons in Jonesboro and Bogalusa was a remarkable 
one, especially while looking at the CORE founding principles. 
CORE philosophy was centered around nonviolent disobedience. The ‘CORE rules for 
ACTION’ were published by the National Advisory Committee of the national civil rights 
movement in 1963.63 The published set of CORE rules consisted of several main principles of 
nonviolent action by which the organization explained its strategy and position within the 
movement. “All groups affiliated with national CORE agree to follow the nonviolent procedure 
in all action which they sponsor.” A set of thirteen rules for action provided a guide for the 
individuals participating in CORE projects. Throughout these thirteen written rules, the 
importance of nonviolence and submission to aggression was central. Rule number six of the 
‘CORE rules for ACTION’ read that: 
 
He [the CORE activist] will meet the anger of any individual or group in the spirit of good will 
and creative reconciliation: he will submit to assault and will not retaliate in kind either by act 
or word.64 
 
Obviously opponents of the collaboration between the Deacons and CORE referred to these 
rules for action. The Congress of Racial Equality, which was founded on the grounds of radical 
nonviolence and even called upon its members to submit to any form of assault, was cooperating 
with a self-defensive organization, ready to fire back at racist assaulters. The question posed by 
FBI agents as to whether or not a nonviolent organization should align itself with the Deacons 
became increasingly important for CORE and consequently played a part in CORE’s 
repositioning, which would soon commence.  
The murder on O’Neal Moore proved to be only the beginning of a violent summer in 
Bogalusa. On July 8, 1965, during a civil rights march in downtown Bogalusa, a flying bottle, 
thrown by white assaulters, struck a seventeen-year-old girl in the face. Two Deacons on the 
scene, Henry Austin and Milton Johnson, quickly drove their car towards the girl and a local 
white nurse, who tried her best to get the injured girl into the car. But the white attackers rushed 
to the car too. While the Deacon members were trying to help the girl and the nurse, an assaulter 
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hit both men repeatedly in the face. In response, Austin took out his gun and shot the white 
attacker in his chest and his neck. Austin and Johnson were immediately arrested by police 
officers, while the startled white assaulters were shouting at policemen, throwing rocks at the 
protesters, and attacked several news photographers.65 That same evening, a rally was organized 
by the all-white National States Rights Party in Bogalusa, where several prominent white 
supremacist leaders responded to the events at the march. Outspoken racist J.B. Stoner was 
outraged over Austin’s defensive action and urged white citizens to fire their black domestic 
help to speed black emigration from the South, while stating that “the nigger […] is somewhere 
between the white man and the ape.”66 Stoner intensified the electrically-fueled atmosphere in 
Bogalusa as he warned his audience that “what the nigger really wants is our white women.”67 
The Klan’s response to the Bogalusa chapter and the Austin shootout predictably 
consisted of more violence against the black community. In July 1965, the Bogalusa Klan 
displayed a familiar performance. On a summer night, a large caravan of cars drove through 
the black neighborhood. Dozens of cloaked men were shouting, taunting, and randomly 
shooting into black homes. The parade was a frightening sight; as all Klan actions of terror 
were. Yet none of the Klansmen expected the evening to end the way it did. As the caravan 
moved through the Quarters, it was suddenly startled by a shower of bullets. The unexpected 
return of fire forced the Klan caravan out of the neighborhood, in what turned out to be the first 
head-to-head violent encounter between the Bogalusa Klan and the Bogalusa Deacons.68 
Austin’s defensive action during the protest was not a once only reaction; the Klan learned that 
these black men were dedicated to defend their community and would not hesitate to fire back. 
The Deacons for Defense and Justice displayed their policy of self-defense twice in one month; 
by protecting nonviolent marchers and by defending the black neighborhood.  
 
A National Platform 
A couple of days after Moore’s death, Charles Sims appeared on national television on the 
Louis Lomax show in Los Angeles, to comment on the events in Bogalusa and further describe 
the intentions of the Deacons. Sims described himself as “The Man” in the Deacons in 
Bogalusa, and explained during the show that the organization was established for the purpose 
of protecting civil rights workers who could not obtain protection from law enforcement 
authorities. Sims took a rather radical approach during the show, and publicly defined the 
Deacons’ intentions far more explicitly than Bradford and the Deacons had done in the official 
charter. He admitted he was aware of the illegality of anyone carrying concealed weapons, but 
he “would rather be caught with a weapon than without one in Bogalusa.” He voiced the opinion 
that in the event of “trouble,” “blood would be flowing down the streets like water.” Sims 
claimed he could rally one hundred armed men within fifteen minutes notice and had done so 
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previously. An FBI report on Sims’ appearance on the Louis Lomax show was concluded by a 
statement that any suggestions made to Sims which favored “nonviolence” were unacceptable 
to him and to the audience, who applauded Sims wildly.”69  
Sims clarified that the Deacons intended to expand throughout the north, which sparked 
more fear for the gun-carrying Deacons. The FBI office in Los Angeles received several 
anonymous telephone protests and letters, complaining about the aims and arms of Sims and 
‘the Deacons.’ To those worried citizens, the Deacons indicated the formation of a black Ku 
Klux Klan; 
 
“Urgently request you ask Justice Dept. to look into Matter of “Deacons for Defense” in 
Bogalusa, one Charles Sims, reported to be president. They are supposed to have Machine guns, 
and hand grenades. I live seven miles from that arsenal!”70 
 
The Deacons were conceived as a threat, and the Bureau intensified its research. During another 
interview with federal agents in the summer of 1965, Earnest Thomas claimed that the Deacons 
consisted of 50 to 55 chapters in various areas in Louisiana, Mississippi and Alabama. He 
declined to enclose the number of members, but mentioned guesses from 5000 to 15000. 
According to Christopher Strain, part of the Deacons’ strategy was to limit public knowledge 
of membership for tactical purposes. He quotes Thomas as stating that “it would not make sense 
to tell you we got four hundred men here, and let ‘the men’ (police) bring eight hundred.”  
In the FBI files, Thomas is quoted while repeating several important statements on the 
Deacons’ intentions, “Thomas […] states a concern that the Deacons may be painted as 
aggressive and trigger happy. They were organized strictly for defense and they are highly 
disciplined.”71 The efforts of Thomas were contradicting. On the one hand he was boasting 
about the expansion of the Deacons while he adhered to some secrecy by declining to give more 
information. Bragging about the size of an armed organization in combination with mysterious 
claims subsequently triggered the interest of the FBI. On the other hand, Thomas was trying to 
persuade the bureau that the Deacons were not just a bunch of violent militants, but a disciplined 
organization. Which indicates he was trying to assure the bureau that any concern about the 
Deacons’ intentions was unnecessary. Nevertheless, Thomas’ contradictory remarks resulted in 
a warning for the FBI headquarters, indicating that the Deacons were violent avengers with 
connections to radical Black Nationalists. On June 10, the documented interview was sent to 
the FBI headquarters, including a thorough research into the Deacons’ actions and their 
connections to several black nationalist organizations.72  
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The FBI’s suspicion was not unjust. The Deacons were expanding their connections. The 
assassination of Malcolm X, the foremost critic of nonviolence, in February 1965, had troubled 
the Deacons and led to the first contact between the Louisianan organization and the 
revolutionary black nationalist wing of the civil rights movement. Earnest Thomas persuaded 
his Jonesboro chapter to initiate a trip to New York. When he arrived in New York he met with 
several former friends and colleagues of Malcolm X, among other black nationalists. The 
revolutionary black activists in New York were heavily influenced by nationalist ideologies 
and Marxist doctrine; in contrast to most black activists in the Deep South. The Deacons were 
admired by most of the black nationalists for their willingness to take up arms and defend their 
rights. Thomas was quickly exposed to an assortment of critics of nonviolence.73 When Thomas 
decided to travel to New York, it sparked his determination to expand the Deacons and establish 
chapters throughout the nation. In New York, he established a support organization called the 
“Friends of the Deacons for Defense and Justice (FDDJ).” However, the organization never 
collected any significant amount, and the FDDJ was discontinued within eight months.74 Before 
he returned to Jonesboro, Thomas also made contact with members of the Revolutionary Action 
Movement (RAM). RAM was a small national network of Marxist-Leninist black 
revolutionaries who adhered to the support of Robert F. Williams, a former NAACP leader 
from Monroe, who had fled to Cuba after controversy over his self-defensive chapter.75 The 
connection between the Deacons and RAM sparked considerable attention from the FBI, as the 
FBI files show.76 The idea of black nationalist groups meeting and the possibility of the 
formation of a coalition of black revolutionaries was the FBI’s largest fear. In FBI files from 
the Counterintelligence Program, this fear of coalition was prominent:  
 
“In unity there is strength; a truism that is no less valid for all its triteness. An effective coalition 
of black nationalist groups might be the first step toward a real “Mau Mau” in America, the 
beginning of a true black revolution.” 77 
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In another FBI memorandum, local agents informed the headquarters that several Louisiana 
political officials had expressed a great deal of concern with reference to the Deacons for 
Defense. Most importantly they feared the group’s connections with black nationalists and their 
potential influence on the southern civil rights movement, especially now that they were 
expanding.78  
In the small town of Homer, Louisiana, an official Deacon chapter was created on June 
10, 1965, with the objective to “meet force with force” in cases of white terror against the black 
community.79 In August of 1965, another chapter of the Deacons was formed in Natchez, 
Mississippi. A prominent member from the Natchez black community asked Robert Hicks to 
come to the town and help establish a chapter there. Instead, Charles Sims travelled to Natchez 
to discuss the formation. After much deliberation, the Natchez group decided not to affiliate 
with the Louisiana Deacons, because the group felt they had little to gain from a formal 
affiliation with the Deacons. Sims was agitated and initially requested a membership payment 
to be made if the Natchez group wished to use the Deacons’ name, but the Natchez group 
refused and Sims refrained. The Mississippi group was known throughout the movement as the 
Natchez Deacons, but they were never an official chapter of the Louisiana Deacons.80 In the 
meantime Thomas and Sims started to organize Deacons chapter in northern cities, by using 
existing connections with black nationalist groups. The Deacon leaders’ efforts and statements 
were often contradicting, and it seemed that the Jonesboro vice president and the Bogalusa 
president were competing for Deacon-expansion in the big cities. Neither one of the Deacon 
leaders were very successful. Designed chapters in Boston, Cleveland and Philadelphia never 
really took off.  Eventually, only Thomas would partially succeed in Chicago.  
 
Exaggeration 
After FBI director Hoover directed several agents by the end of 1965 to investigate the accuracy 
of the claims made by Thomas, concerning the amount of Deacon members and chapters, the 
Director received dozens of reports from southern, southeastern, and even some eastern states. 
Most of the agents reported the same; no information had been found to indicate a formation of 
a chapter of the Deacons for Defense in Justice in the area.81 The only responding bureaus who 
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reported Deacon-activity were New Orleans and San Antonio, Texas. New Orleans was 
obvious, as their office was responsible for monitoring activity in Jonesboro, Bogalusa, and 
Homer. The San Antonio office was more surprising. The office reported statements made in a 
local newspaper by a Cornell University student named Mark Klein, who claimed to be 
responsible for the formation of The Committee to Aid the Deacons in Austin, Texas.82 Klein, 
who called himself a “revolutionary socialist,” organized events during which he spoke of the 
importance of self-defense. He claimed that African Americans organizing in armed self-
defensive groups was the next stage in “the negro struggle.”83 The Texan committee did not 
spark a lot of fear among federal officials, but in the FBI it was mentioned that “Klein voiced 
Communistic propaganda.” Although the law student continued his efforts for the Deacons for 
a while, but never raised significant funds. 84 
After Hoover sent out the command for investigation, a memorandum consisting of an 
extensive analysis of the Deacons was sent to the headquarters. The file explained that although 
the statements made by Deacon leaders were generally accurate in respect to the purposes of 
the group; the motivation for its’ establishment; its relationship to CORE; and the possession 
of firearms, there were a number of repeated inaccuracies and exaggerations. First of all, 
Deacon leaders Thomas and Sims claimed to have over 50 chapters throughout the United 
States. FBI investigation revealed that the only existing official chapters were located in 
Jonesboro, Bogalusa, and Homer, and therefore only in the state of Louisiana. As Thomas 
explained during the first meeting in Bogalusa, the original Deacons agreed that all future 
chapters would have to be channeled into the headquarters in Jonesboro. Although the Bogalusa 
chapter allegedly received several requests for possible set-ups across the South, actual requests 
were never officially accepted nor enacted by the headquarters in Jonesboro. Furthermore, the 
headquarters in Jonesboro only had the authority to establish chapters within the state.85 In 
Natchez however, the group of armed men who named themselves the Deacons supported 
economic boycotts in southwest Mississippi. This Deacon chapter may not have been officially 
chartered through the Jonesboro Deacons, but their impact on the Natchez black community 
and the national image of the Deacons was of substantial importance.86  
However, the Deacons’ total membership estimates were dubbed “highly exaggerated” 
in the FBI report. “Membership probably no more than a few hundred.”87 An unidentified 
Deacon member contacted federal agents and charged that the Deacons were not as big as 
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claimed. “This surely illustrates the uncertainty as to the actual facts notwithstanding newspaper 
accounts.” While covering the aspect of weapons, the FBI memorandum confirmed that the 
Deacons possessed firearms. Nevertheless, the memorandum downplayed the issue of carrying 
weapons by stating that most rural southerners possess firearms. The carrying of rifles and 
pistols in rural areas was commonplace by white and black citizens, and the Louisiana state law 
allowed for anyone to carry firearms, as long as the weapon was not concealed on the person. 
Such firearms could easily be bought at local stores. The claim of Deacon members and leaders 
that they were in possession of machineguns and hand grenades was invalidated, as the Bureau 
found no indication that the Deacons were in possession of such heavy arms.88  
As the memorandum was drawn to an end, the agent concluded that if the Deacons 
claimed to be organized for defensive purposes and as a retaliation to Klan violence against the 
black community, “it is not surprising that Deacons leaders would exaggerate its strength for 
the purpose of discouraging violence against Negroes and to help encourage increased 
membership”.89 Although the memorandum gave the impression that the Deacons were no 
longer of any interest to the FBI, the Bureau continued to monitor them. Especially when the 
national civil rights movement was shifting towards a more radical ideology.  
 
Violence on the Horizon 
In July 1965, a teletype from the Charlotte FBI office informed the headquarters of statements 
made by CORE’s James Farmer after O’Neale Moore’s death, in which he refused to denounce 
or criticize the Deacons for their self-defensive approach. The national director of CORE stated 
that “Negroes in this nation are down to about their last ounce of patience. For all the hoopla 
and the speechmaking and legislation, very little has changed in the reality of Negro life in this 
country.” Farmer was voicing an attitude of aggravation which was brewing among the black 
population. Many civil rights activists started to perceive armed self-defense as a necessary tool 
for the civil rights struggle in the South, since the nonviolent strategy did not bring about 
enough change. During a CORE convention that month, Jonesboro Deacon Thomas was present 
and declared that the period of African American nonviolence was over. He accused white men 
of having given the black community new laws and apparent privileges under the Civil Rights 
Act of 1964, but when black men and women tried to use those laws and privileges, they were 
beaten. He encouraged the idea of black self-protection by stating that “we must have the 
Deacons to let the Klan know that negroes as a whole are not nonviolent”, indicating that the 
Deacons would take it upon themselves to defend the Act of 1964 and those who tried to enforce 
equality.90 He argued that the black community should not have to wait for white northern 
strategies or permission to enforce the new laws of integration. In another interview that month, 
Thomas again pressed on the uselessness of nonviolence: “They can come down and play non-
violence with those rednecks all they want, we who live down there have our own way of 
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handling things.”91 James Farmer described the use of self-defense by the Deacons in a way 
that best reflects how many activists in the South viewed the emergence of armed protection: 
 
“It’s clear that violence maybe on the horizon. And if violence is on the horizon, I would 
certainly prefer to see it channeled into a defense discipline than the random homicide and 
suicide of rioting.” 92 
 
Farmer’s fear of the “suicide of rioting” became reality in California by the end of the 
summer of 1965. From August 11 to 16, riots quelled the neighborhood of Watts in Los 
Angeles. After a local African American man was arrested, a minor argument with police 
officers escalated into a fight. Anger among the black community over rumors of police 
brutality, combined with a long-time feeling of despair over socio-economic racism and living 
conditions motivated thousands of black citizens to take to the streets. Six days of looting 
followed. The national guard was sent in and eventually ended the riots. Thirty-four people, 
mostly black citizens, were killed over the time-span of six days, twenty-three of whom were 
shot by law enforcement.93 The riots and the federal response became a central topic among 
civil rights organizations, especially in respect to the increasing popularity of armed resistance. 
By the end of August, Robert Hicks of Bogalusa traveled to Detroit, Michigan, as a 
spokesperson for the Deacons. In Detroit he attended a so-called freedom dinner in honor of 
the Deacons, during which the utmost topics resolved around the Watts riots. Several 
spokesmen at the dinner referred to the riots as a class war and predicted more of such outbreaks 
if the black population would not be treated differently by the federal government. One speaker 
noted that violence at times was the only way of letting the white establishment know that the 
black people were tired of being pushed around. A Michigan Congressman argued that although 
he did not believe in violence, he felt a man was less a man if he would not defend himself, his 
property and his family. “Hear me, Mr. President, you had better take the money you are 
spending in Vietnam to fight an uncalled for war and spend it here on the big city slums or else 
you will have more class wars.”94 Another congressman at the dinner acknowledged that 
various situations in the civil rights movement concerning nonviolent action called for new 
techniques and approaches, and confirmed the Deacons were perhaps displaying such a new 
approach through self-defensive organizing.  
When Hicks took the stand himself, he tried to avoid the topic of the riots, and instead 
focused on the discipline of strict self-defense. The Deacons only used defensive violence when 
they were under attack and according to Hicks, these defensive actions were paying off. The 
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black communities of Jonesboro and Bogalusa saw the number of white attacks decline.95 
Slowly but certainly, the situation in the Louisianan towns was changing for the better. The 
decline suggested that Klan-members were hesitant to terrorize black citizens if it meant their 
own lives were at risk.96 The approach of organized self-defensive was working for the black 
communities in Jonesboro and Bogalusa, so why could it not work for other black communities 
throughout the United States?97 More Deacon leaders voiced their contentment with the effect 
the organization had on white assaults in the South. On September 29, 1965, Charles Sims 
appeared on the Lomax Show again, this time accompanied by A.Z. Young of the Bogalusa 
Civic and Voters League.  Both men argued that the efforts of the Klan to terrorize the civil 
rights workers in Bogalusa was no longer successful, thanks to the Deacons’ presence. Young 
claimed that the Klan was on the way out; “they still ride, but now they are careful when and 
where they ride.”98 In another interview, Earnest Thomas claimed approximately the same 
about the Klan in Jonesboro. The Klan was quieter there too because of the Deacons’ armed 
self-defense.99  
The effect the Deacons had on white vigilante assault in Louisiana was demonstrated 
on May 13, 1966, when a shooting occurred outside the Acme Café in Bogalusa around 
midnight. Three black men picketed the café, which was under Federal Court order to integrate. 
The men were denied service and after a short standoff they decided to leave. But as they walked 
outside, one of the men was attacked by a white local. The three men got away and ran to their 
car to grab their guns. Several shots were fired at the café as the men drove away from the 
scene. Approximately an hour later, a group of armed Deacons arrived at the Acme. The scene 
of about twenty armed men intimidated the white locals and refrained them from more 
provocation. No violence occurred, but the police arrived to the scene within minutes upon the 
Deacons’ appearance and arrested about ten of the black men. The next day, as a response to 
the events of the previous night, civil rights activists decided to enter various cafés in Bogalusa 
to challenge the ongoing segregation. During these actions, white assaulters did not strike again. 
The idea of provoking the activists into summoning twenty armed Deacons must have seemed 
dispensable. As Hicks, Sims, Young and Thomas had all claimed before, white assaulters were 
increasingly hesitant when their lives were at risk, causing the number of white attacks to 
decline.  
However, the local law enforcement had once again shown to be unwilling to enforce 
the law as instructed by the Civil Rights Act of 1964. The police arrested the Deacons who 
arrived at the scene, and took no further action against the white attacker who initially assaulted 
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the black activist, nor the white bar-owner who had violated federal orders by refusing service 
to the three black men. The police actions infuriated the Deacons and the black community of 
Jonesboro. Local FBI agents who intended to interview Deacon members about the events in 
May, reported that some of them made derogatory remarks regarding the FBI and the 
Department of Justice in connection to Civil Rights Activists. One Deacon said he thought the 
Department of Justice was not worth “shit”, and that if any more black citizens would be 
arrested for entering the Acme Café, “we will come to the Acme and tear that place up.”100  
In a way the Bogalusa chapter overshadowed the Jonesboro headquarters, because of 
the media attention it received after violent events such as the Austin-shooting and the Acmé 
café events. Nevertheless, the Bogalusa and the Jonesboro chapter both expressed their 
contentment with the effect the organization had on Klan-violence. Throughout the United 
States, African Americans were exploring different strategies in the struggle for civil rights. In 
many of those new approaches patience and white collaboration were of minor importance. A 
growing number of black Americans felt that nonviolence had brought no change. For them, 
King’s famous and undoubtedly courageous approach was no longer effective enough. The 
increasing demand for black strength and cohesion placed a fresh emphasis on “black 
consciousness” – the demand for racial pride, strength, and solidarity, and cleared the way for 
a new ideology in African American activism. The ideology of Black Power.101 
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3 ‘Don’t you know the Negro can kill too?’ 
 
The self-defensive approach became increasingly appealing to African American activists, 
causing a deeper rift between supporters and opponents of nonviolence. Examples of self-
defensive organizations in the South, such as the Deacons, inspired other activists to explore 
the effectiveness of armed resistance. In growing debates on self-defense, activists started to 
accept armed resistance as a necessity in the struggle for black equality in the South. The 
involvement of the Deacons with organizations such as CORE and SNCC marked a shift in the 
civil rights movement. The movement would change even more when the ideology of Black 
Power entered the realm of African American activism in 1965. 
 
Black Power 
Former NAACP leader Robert F. Williams had occasionally mentioned the term “Black Power” 
in a political context during his leadership in Monroe, Mississippi, in the 1950s and 60s. Several 
black activists incorporated the term in organizational texts, and in June of 1966 chairman of 
SNCC Stokely Carmichael gave his first speech on Black Power. Carmichael’s speech stuck. 
He explained the term by emphasizing black self-defense and black self-reliance, as he stressed 
the importance of black autonomy. Carmichael believed that if the black community would 
establish a self-sufficient economy, including black-owned stores, cooperatives, and medias, 
the white power-structure would be weakened, and African Americans would not be retained 
in the grip of white economic dependency. Carmichael used the phrase “Black Power” to urge 
black pride and socio-economical independence, and argued that “all black Americans should 
begin building independent political, economic, and cultural institutions.”102 He also urged the 
black community to elect black candidates during elections, thereby obtaining a degree of black 
power through the ballot process.103 This increasing awareness of the effect of black 
independency was an important change in civil rights movement-thought, and displayed a 
sentiment that was spreading among many of the nation’s black activists. Civil rights 
organizations such as CORE and SNCC were shifting towards an ideology of black self –
reliance. As James Farmer had voiced accurately a year earlier; the African American 
population was done being patient and obedient.  
Preceding Carmichael’s very first speech on Black Power was a southern Civil Rights 
demonstration that included interference of the Deacons; the Meredith March Against Fear. On 
June 6, 1966, activist leader and writer James Meredith decided to walk a solitary march from 
Memphis, Tennessee to Jackson, Mississippi in an effort to address the continuing racism in 
the rural Deep South, despite the enactment of the Civil Rights Act of 1964. Unique about his 
initiative was his decision to invite only individual black men to join him on his walk. He did 
not want the national civil rights organizations to be involved, and certainly wanted no media 
circus. However, on the second day of his march, Meredith was shot by a white supremacist 
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who waited for him along the road. The one thing Meredith did not want, happened. Major civil 
rights organizations rallied to the cause, vowing to carry on the march in Meredith’s name, and 
the event became highly publicized in the national media. Fortunately, as a result of the media 
attention, the Mississippi state officials were pressured into promising to protect the marchers 
from white terror, making sure they would finish what Meredith had started.104 
 A broad range of civil rights organizations took part in the March Against Fear. Martin 
Luther King and his SCLC, Stokely Carmichael and the SNCC, Floyd McKissick of CORE and 
the Mississippi Freedom Democratic Party (MFDP). But most striking was the participation of 
a group of armed men, dedicated to protect the protesters in case the state officials would 
decline to do so; the Deacons. FBI agents observed Thomas as participator in the March Against 
Fear. He acted as head of the Deacons, supervising the armed protection for members of the 
march.105 But not everyone was content with their involvement. While discussing the course of 
the march, the leaders of the large organizations were joined by members of the Deacons. 
Thomas and his group intended to carry their guns while marching, and their intentions were 
supported by SNCC’s Carmichael and CORE’s McKissick. King however, who believed 
indisputably in the effect of nonviolence, insisted no one would openly carry guns during the 
march. Thomas eventually agreed to King’s wishes, but the discussion concerning armed self-
defense rapidly expanded throughout the time-span of the march, and the gap between those in 
favor of King’s nonviolence and those in favor of Thomas’ defensive approach increased, with 
Carmichael being the most vocal advocate for the Deacons.106 
 During the march, Carmichael was briefly arrested for questionable reasons. His anger 
over the mistreatment caused him to address the rhetoric of self-defensive action at an evening 
rally on June 16. Historian Adam Fairclough quotes him as stating; “This is the 27th time I’ve 
been arrested. I ain’t gonna be arrested no more.. […]Every court house in Mississippi should 
be burned down tomorrow so we can get rid of the dirt.”107 The next evening, he held a similar 
rally at which he cheered the famous words; “What do want?”, to which the audience 
responded: “Black Power!” During a conference for the so-called Coordinating Counsel for 
Black Power, later that year, Carmichael again defined black power in terms of the attainment 
of political and economic goals by African Americans. He compared the black man to a dog, 
stating that a barking dog never bites. He suggested that the black leaders who threw in with 
the power structure by using nonviolence and by depending on white support, such as Martin 
Luther King, could be compared to this barking dog; the power structure did not fear them, 
because they knew they would not do anything. Carmichael said that the other black leaders 
could be compared to the other dogs who, if pushed hard enough, would eventually bite. If the 
system were to continue to push the black community, sooner or later the black community 
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would react. Carmichael then provocatively asked the group, “don’t you know the Negro can 
kill, too?”108  
As a response to Carmichael’s statements and the national media attention his 
statements attracted, King tried to redefine Black Power in terms of conventional political 
power and urged the marchers to drop the talk of black power. His urges were not convincing, 
especially when the march entered its third week. A few days after Carmichael’s speech, federal 
and state authorities decided to reduce protection during the March from twenty guards to only 
four. Several days later, King asked Thomas to travel to Jonesboro and retrieve radio equipment 
for the march. Thomas agreed and the Deacons left. While the Deacons were on their mission, 
the marchers arrived in Philadelphia, Mississippi, where three CORE volunteers had been 
murdered by Klansmen in the summer of 1964. Over two hundred marchers entered Neshoba 
County where the Deputy Sheriff, complicit in the Mississippi Burning murders, awaited them. 
He was accompanied by a group of angry-looking white men, who followed up on an arranged 
signal by throwing bottles, firecrackers and rocks at the marchers. The four guards who were 
still present were unable to protect the protesters, while some of the black marchers attempted 
to fight back. According to Lance Hill, Earnest Thomas was furious when he heard King had 
taken the marchers to Philadelphia while the Deacons were absent. He suspected King had sent 
him away on purpose, to prevent him from engaging in retaliatory violence in case of an attack 
by white assaulters.109  
When one hundred state troopers attacked the activists by firing tear gas canisters and 
kicking those who failed to clear the site, it became even more difficult to argue against self-
defense. The federal government left the marchers to the mercy of the state authorities, which 
intensified the increasing sentiment among activists that the black community should protect 
itself by any means. The terrifying events during the last days of the march raised the debate 
between nonviolence and self-defense beyond the level of theory. Thomas and the Deacons 
refused to agree to King’s requests of not carrying guns any longer and finished the march fully 
armed. When the March Against Fear came to an end in Jackson on June 26, 1966, it seemed 
to have caused more polarization between the civil rights organizations than it had brought 
unity. And the popularity of “Black Power” kept growing. 110 
On July 24, a little over a month after Carmichael first used the term, the New York 
Times published a flyer in cooperation with the NAACP. The flyer contained brief explanations 
of “the Big Five” and their stances on the issue of Black Power. The NAACP and its executive 
director Roy Wilkins were praised as the most important organization and the most influential 
political figure in civil rights. “To Mr. Wilkins, Black Power means black racism and “black 
death”.” The National Urban League and its executive director Whitney Young were admired 
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in the flyer for speaking the language of big businesses and the government, and for winning 
white support. “[Mr. Young] believes Black Power is self-defeating and dangerous”.111 The 
two most outspoken black critics of Black Power were positively portrayed by the New York 
Times flyer, along with the SCLC and the role of Martin Luther King. “An exponent of 
nonviolence, [King] condemns Black Power, but does not go as far as some who brand it black 
racism.” CORE and the SNCC however, were wearily criticized for their adherence to the idea 
of Black Power and CORE’s recent membership decline was “possibly as a result of growing 
Black Power philosophy”. The SNCC was portrayed the worst. An organization made up of 
“kids, depending upon the prevailing mood and state of tension”, whose members live in “the 
shacks of Negro communities”.112 CORE’s McKissick and SNCC’s Carmichael were 
mentioned as the principal advocates of Black Power.  
The Times’ flyer was not incorrect while reporting the stances of the ‘Big Five’. 
NAACP, NUL and SNCC did indeed oppose the Black Power-rhetoric which was unfolding 
throughout the nation. Roy Wilkins even claimed that “the term “Black Power” means anti-
white power […] it is a reverse Mississippi, a reverse Hitler, a reverse Ku Klux Klan.”113 
Wilkins was voicing the concerns of white citizens and many prominent middle-class black 
leaders, which was unsurprising. Wilkins and the NAACP had always consisted of high-
ranking, middle class blacks who relied on white support. Losing white support would be 
crucial for the NAACP’s monetary supplies. Furthermore, NAACP, NUL and SNCC all had in 
common the belief that full integration and equality would be accomplished by involving the 
white community in the struggle for civil rights. 
CORE and SNCC were shifting towards a strategy of excluding the white community 
and focusing on black autonomy. CORE openly supported Black Power, and SNCC’s 
Carmichael basically invented it. During a conference in November, 1966, the president of the 
Coordinating Council for Black Power argued that Black Power could well be the turning point 
of the black revolution. He stated that when the black community would start channelizing 
resources back into the community, money, jobs, and ultimately real black power would follow. 
Which, in return, would provide political and social gains.114 Organizations such as the 
Revolutionary Action Movement and the radicalizing SNCC gained in popularity, while King 
and moderate organizations such as SNCC tried their best to calm down the intensification of 
the Black Power movement. 
 
The Deacons and Black Power 
At a first glance, the Deacons and the Black Power movement seemed to have a lot in common 
and several Deacon members got more involved with the radical ideas of the black power 
movement. An FBI report from November, 1966, warned the Bureau of a particular member of 
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the Deacons in Bogalusa, who spoke during a conference for Black Power. The conference, 
which was organized by the CCBP, included appearances from members and leaders of CORE, 
SNCC, and the Deacons. The Deacon member who spoke at this conference was Henry Austin, 
the man who shot a white assaulter during a march in Bogalusa in the summer of 1965. 
According to the report, Austin “advocates the revolution and follows philosophy of Red China, 
distributing cardboard posters with pictures of Uncle Sam, opposing Vietnam.”115 Austin was 
known to be a firm vocalist for black self-determination. During an open forum before the 
Socialist Workers Party in Cleveland, Ohio in January 1967, Henry Austin said that the 
Deacons were blazing a trail for justice. “When the police send in the KKK to settle an incident, 
and when the Deacons show up, it is so quiet you can hear two cotton balls being rubbed 
together,” he said, “We have been under white power for 400 years, and we are tired of it. One 
of these days we will be under black power. When the Negro does come out of the ghetto’s, 
America will need the National Guard for protection. We don’t want civil rights or voting rights 
now. It is out of the question at this time.”116 During his speech before the Socials Workers 
Party, Austin implied retaliatory violence. These implications were very much in conflict with 
the original charter of the Deacons as it was formulated in Jonesboro. It started to become 
apparent that the Deacons were not acting as a coherent organization, rather several members 
were speaking as if they were spokespersons of the Deacons. When in fact, they simply voiced 
their own opinions. 
On the 4th and 5th of September, 1966, the Deacons were invited to a meeting in Detroit, 
Michigan. The Organization for Black Power (OBP) organized a “steering committee”, which 
was supposed to be a small group, but the national director of the OBP invited many leaders 
from militant black organizations such as RAM. The FBI file covering this meeting presents an 
accurate image of the increasing popularity of black self-determination and black nationalism 
among civil rights organizations. Several of the attendees were associated with the Black 
Nationalist movement, and some blamed the Organization for Black Power for being too mild 
in dealing with problems. Most of these vocal attendees were RAM members, who called for 
severe measures such as the refusal of military service among blacks. Outside the meeting, 
flyers were handed out to passing African Americans that read; 
 
“The white racist decision workers (Johnson and the other thugs), must take us for stone fools 
if they think black people will serve as cannon fodder for the Hitler type war machine designed 
to mercilessly slaughter Asians in Vietnam. Especially in the light of the atrocities committed 
by the racist beasts in Los Angeles.” 
 
During the meeting, Thomas spoke as a representative for the Deacons. Compared to other 
attendees, his opinions were mild. He explained the Deacons’ strategy of self-defense as a 
means to protect oneself and others of the black community from attacks by white people in the 
South, and he urgently pressed those present to refrain from becoming involved in any acts of 
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violence such as riots. Thomas and the Deacons did not intent to be part of any national 
revolution, their main issue remained to deter Klan violence and expand to the North to establish 
chapters that would do the same. His presentation did not impress the urban activists at the 
meeting. RAM members concluded the meeting by calling for the black community to “join 
50,000 angry blacks” in a protest demonstration at Fort Wayne, Detroit; “We are serving notice 
to the white racist that we will fight a nitty gritty, toe to toe, head wupping struggle in raceland 
U.S.A. to liberate our people rather than play an incognito slave role on this earth again.”117 
The strategy of black control over black institutions became the primary pinnacle of Black 
Power and the Deacons had been the first southern civil rights self-defense organization in the 
South to have full black-control over the organization. However, as the Deacons got more 
involved with the Black Power movement, the contrast between the Louisianan organization 
and the new black nationalist ideology became more apparent. The most important factor of 
this contrast was the rural versus urban divide. The organizational approach of a local 
organization such as the Deacons was effective against Klan-violence in rural areas in the Deep 
South. But in the big cities, the Ku Klan Klan was not the biggest threat in the lives of black 
citizens. In the cities, police violence and government oppression were the most pressuring 
topics. 
 
Chicago 
Despite Thomas’ relatively mild stance during the meeting in Detroit, he was still highly 
dedicated to expand the Deacons to the North. FBI sources indicate that Thomas made several 
contacts in Chicago in 1965 and another memorandum states that a Deacons office was opened 
there in July 1966.118 Although the Chicago chapter was never channeled through the Jonesboro 
headquarters and therefore never officially affiliated with the Louisiana Deacons, the presence 
of the Chicago chapter was quite noticeable and caused a lot of local media and police attention. 
When Martin Luther King spoke at a civil rights meeting in Chicago, the FBI reported that 
approximately forty black men, who indicated they were Deacon members, guarded the area to 
reportedly protect King and other civil rights leaders while carrying firearms. When Carmichael 
spoke to a group in Chicago around the same time, a comparable amount of supposed Deacons 
provided armed protection. The group did not take an active part in the meetings, but only 
guarded the speakers.119 In Chicago, the first and only big city chapter was mostly involved 
with local black issues. When two black families moved into a prominently white 
neighborhood, they were met with white harassment. According to FBI statements, the Chicago 
Deacons warned that if the police failed to give these families adequate protection, the Deacons 
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would have men patrol the area instead, to protect the families. After the Deacons’ warning, the 
police patrol cars in the district were put on special notice and no more incidents occurred.120 
However, the appearances of the Deacons in Chicago were received with skepticism, 
especially after Thomas appeared on several radio programs. During those radio appearances, 
Thomas developed a habit of making exaggerated claims. He claimed the Chicago chapter had 
455 members and he would be able to summon thousands of Deacons to Chicago in the next 
three months to combat the Klan in Chicago and protect demonstrators from police violence. 
Listeners who called in were skeptical and aggravated with Thomas’ statements, especially with 
regard to his announcement of bringing thousands of Deacons into the city;  
 
“Will you listen to me […] now you know you ain’t got no fifteen thousand Deacons. There 
ain’t an organization among the Negroes today got fifteen thousand Negroes in it.” 
 
Callers accused Thomas of inciting violence by building up more hatred between the black and 
white population. One caller was infuriated that Thomas came to Chicago in the first place. 
“We don’t want no pistol packing Deacons here. I’m a Negro myself and I’m going to tell you 
so far as I’m concerned, you should never have come here!”121  
Black citizens of Chicago did not recognize the picture Thomas painted of Klan-threat. 
Although Klan-terror was often tolerated by local authorities in southern states such as 
Louisiana, it was forbidden by federal law. Therefore, organizations such as the Deacons could 
refer to laws such as the Civil Rights Act for their legitimacy of being a protective squad. 
Furthermore, the Louisiana Deacons only had a relatively small population to cover. Contrary 
to the situations in Jonesboro and Bogalusa, in Chicago there were no caravans filled with 
hooded racists. Instead, the black population of Chicago faced the daily threat of police 
brutality. Chicago black leaders and activists believed that police brutality needed a very 
different approach than Klan-terror. Big city police departments often enjoyed the 
unconditional support of the state and federal government, and were therefore practically 
inviolable. A black protectionist squad, armed with guns and rivals, would not stand a chance 
against a well-equipped police department. Timuel Black, the president of the Negro American 
Labor Counsel of Chicago ridiculed Thomas and the Deacons and stated that they only knew 
how to get rid of the Klan, but did not know anything about law and order, and “the ordinary 
ways of achieving justice.” Black deemed the national statements and appearances of Thomas 
as nothing more than propaganda to scare off Klansmen.122  
 
Fading Away 
According to FBI investigation, the Bogalusa chapter was increasingly dissatisfied with Charles 
Sims as president. Several members dubbed Sims “too militant”. He was growing more towards 
the militant Black Power activists and thereby estranged himself from the Louisiana Deacons, 
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who did not intend to become a revolutionary force. The Bogalusa chapter was content with its 
strategy of determining Klan-violence by self-defense, and Royan Burris was eventually elected 
president of the Bogalusa chapter instead of Sims.123  In Chicago, Thomas received virtually no 
support from Civil Rights groups, and his performances in the big city created more controversy 
than benefits for the expansion of the Deacons. At the same time, it became apparent that he 
was isolating himself from the Louisiana chapters, too. In Jonesboro, the same sentiment lived 
among local Deacon members, who did not recognize northern calls for revolution, and did not 
share Thomas’ prospects of expansion. In fact, FBI files dating from the summer of 1966 
claimed that he was no longer a representative of the Louisiana Deacons and his title as 
Northern Regional Vice President was self-appointed; “He claims to be a public relations man. 
He talks big, “puffs” himself up and is a name dropper and a “gasser”.”124 In reality, he acted 
on his own, without support from his former Jonesboro chapter. Another report from November 
22, 1966, informed the headquarters that Earnest Thomas was dropped as vice president of the 
Deacons for Defense of Jonesboro at an unknown time.125 
Nevertheless, Hill describes how many left-wing and revolutionary black nationalists 
tried to recruit Thomas for their cause, but Thomas refused and continued his efforts to establish 
more Deacon chapters. After he appeared on a radio talk show in Chicago in 1966, Elijah 
Muhammad even asked Thomas to join the black separatist Nation of Islam. Federal agents 
feared in November 1966 that Thomas was attempting to set up an organization paralleling the 
Black Muslims, but one in which he was the national leader. In reality, as Hill describes, 
Thomas declined the Muslim’s offer because he was not willing to convert to Islam. and 
because the Muslims were too radical for him.126 A similar situation occurred when Thomas 
traveled to California  a year before and met with Bobby Seale. Seale, who would eventually 
establish the Black Panther Party together with Huey P. Newton, posed the idea of founding a 
Deacons chapter in Los Angeles. Thomas was flattered by Seale’s adoration for the Deacons, 
but he too appeared “too radical”, and the Deacon dropped the subject of an LA chapter. The 
Black Panther Party, which was established by Seale in October 1966, turned out far more 
militant and radical than the Deacons ever were. However, Seale and Newton would later claim 
the Deacons served as an inspiration for the formation of the Black Panther Party.127 
Thomas occasionally claimed to have set up Deacon chapters in several cities on a 
militant basis, but according to members interviewed by federal agents, the efforts on the part 
of Thomas were entirely on his own and were not supported or condoned by the Deacons of 
Jonesboro. The organizations’ headquarters never received any requests for chapters from 
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anywhere outside of the state of Louisiana.128 A contradicting outcome, given that Thomas 
himself had firmly addressed the importance of establishing new chapters through the 
Jonesboro headquarters during his very first speech in Bogalusa in 1965, but was now trying to 
establish unofficial Deacon chapters. Thomas continued to represent himself as the spokesman 
for the Deacons, but according to an FBI report from November 27, 1967, he was the only 
Deacon members from Louisiana known to still be active at this point. At the same time, 
Thomas was often absent at his small Chicago chapter, because his wife and children still lived 
in Jonesboro. When Thomas flew to Cuba in July 1966 to meet with Robert F. Williams, which 
never happened, it sparked a short reemergence of intensive FBI interest. Especially after 
Thomas continued his travels to China, the bureaus interest in the Deacon leader peaked. But 
no substantial results came for Thomas’ visits, and the FBI soon learned the Deacons were no 
longer an extensive threat. The bureaus’ top priority was drawn away from Thomas, as the 
militant Black Panther Party was expanding from Oakland, California.129  
By the late 1960s, the Deacons in rural Louisiana recognized their presence was no 
longer a crucial necessity for the protection of the black community. The Deacons in the rural 
South had formed an armed squad which scared off Klan-violence and reduced police 
interference. The black men had organized out of necessity and by 1968, the organization’s 
local objectives were realized. Most members did not care for national expansions and felt no 
need to initiate new objectives for the organization. They believed the organization had lived 
up to its expectations and was no longer required. As a result, Deacon membership rapidly 
decreased. By March 1968, the FBI reported that the Jonesboro Deacons had become inactive 
and were of little to no significance, except for a few members who remained involved with 
other civil right organizations.130 In January of 1967, agents already discovered the phone 
number of the Deacons Chicago chapter to be disconnected. The Chicago group was in 
extremely poor financial condition and in 1968 it was practically a non-existent organization.131 
After he returned from China, Thomas shortly joined SNCC’s Carmichael as his personal 
Deacon-bodyguard and spokesperson, but he soon dropped his organizing activities and left the 
Deacons that year. According to Hill to explore a new career as a bodyguard for football and 
movie star Jim Brown.132 More news of inactive Deacon chapters was reported by the Jackson 
office, who informed the FBI headquarters that the Natchez Deacons “feel they are no longer 
needed.”133 Although the Natchez Deacons were never an official division of the Louisiana 
Deacons, they had followed approximately the same path as the Louisiana chapters did. Their 
presence had minimalized Klan-terror and by the end of the 1960s the group felt like their 
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organization was no longer needed. News of the disbandment of the Homer chapter quickly 
followed. The final FBI report on the activity of the Deacons for Defense and Justice was sent 
out on October 15, 1970, declaring that during the past six months, there was no Deacon activity 
in Bogalusa: “As of this date the Bogalusa Unit is completely inactive.”134 
The self-defensive civil rights organization never expanded substantially outside of 
Louisiana. Earnest Thomas’ failed efforts to expand the Deacons for Defense and Justice to the 
North display an inherited contrast between the Deacons and the Black Power movement. The 
Deacons’ original strategy of self-defense against rural Klan-violence did not catch on beyond 
the rural South. The rural versus urban divide was crucial for the Thomas’ intended expansion. 
In the urban areas, Black Nationalist groups embraced the Black Power movement and merged 
the ideology with a revolutionary concept of black militancy, whereas the Deacons’ vital goal 
remained to eliminate Klan violence by the means of armed self-defense. The northern cities 
did not embrace the Deacons’ philosophy in the same way the rural towns of Jonesboro and 
Bogalusa had embraced it. Furthermore, most Deacon members did not share Thomas’ 
determination of expansion and by 1968 most of the southern Deacons agreed that their mission 
was accomplished.  
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Conclusion 
The short existence of the Deacons for Defense and Justice had a considerable effect on the 
civil rights struggle in the South. Aggravation over local government’s reluctance to execute 
the Civil Rights Act of 1964, combined with outrage over racist violence and the unwillingness 
of the federal government to provide protection, instigated a regional sentiment among African 
Americans in the South in 1965. The nonviolent movement decreased in popularity, as its 
effectiveness was disputed among the black community. Furthermore, the non-violent 
strategy’s adherence to submissiveness constrained the efforts of civil rights activists to recruit 
black men to the movement’s cause. The Freedom Summer, in an effort to improve the southern 
situation, only increased a white violent response and had deathly consequences for civil rights 
activists and the black community. But instead of scaring off activism, white vigilante violence 
fueled the black community’s need for protection and self-defense. The story of the Deacons 
displays the determination of a rural black community to obtain the autonomy over their own 
lives. The Deacons for Defense and Justice were created in the vacuum of a changing sentiment, 
in which armed resistance became a crucial factor of the struggle for black equality in the South.  
The Deacons’ presence was a defensive necessity, which proved to be imperative for 
the protection of the black communities in the Louisianan towns on several occasions when 
black citizens were attacked by vigilantes. The local Klan chapters initially responded to CORE 
activism and the Deacons by lashing out, but the violent racists soon learned that this new 
defensive squad would respond to violence with violence. To many white assaulters, the 
aspiration to suppress black integration with violence did not outshine the risk of getting killed 
by an armed group of black men. Subsequently, the number of violent Klan-attacks declined. 
The Deacons were able to organize based on the strategy of self-defense, because they were 
established as a self-reliant organization, independent from the big national civil rights 
organizations. The defensive civil rights group did not rely on an overarching parent 
organization, but instead held the autonomy over the organization in their own hands, which 
was an important development for black self-reliance in the rural South.  The Deacons created 
an organizational model from skills and resources provided by the local black community. 
Furthermore, the self-defensive civil rights organization was under full black control, which 
highlighted the desire for self-determination. Black southern men who were forced to defend 
activists by means of armed resistance were proud of their ability to protect themselves and 
their communities, as self-defensive violence became an assertion of black manhood. The 
Jackson High school boycott in Jonesboro became the first public display of the local black 
community’s demand for black control over black institutions, which correlated closely to the 
all-black control the Deacons had over their organization 
While keeping in mind the complex tensions between the priorities of rural black 
communities and national civil rights organizations, the vacuum in which the Deacons were 
created influenced the CORE workers in Jonesboro as well. Eventually, members of CORE and 
SNCC would become vocal advocates for the Black Power movement, as the self-defensive 
approach and the demand for black autonomy became increasingly appealing to African 
American activists, causing a deeper rift between supporters and opponents of nonviolence. 
Examples of self-defensive organizations in the South, such as the Deacons, inspired other 
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activists to explore the effectiveness of armed resistance. The involvement of the Deacons with 
organizations such as CORE and SNCC marked a change of sentiment in the civil rights 
movement. The armed organization’s involvement with civil rights demonstrations such as the 
Meredith March could have only happened while the broader sentiment of the movement was 
already heading more towards black militancy.  
 The Deacons fused a strategy of self-defense with political organizing by placing 
themselves within the public debate on civil rights and armed resistance. The Deacons entered 
a national platform through appearances on radio shows and interviews. Once the group gave 
an organizational form to self-defense as part of the civil rights movement, they had to explain 
their strategy on a public platform. The Deacons’ national representation received a positive 
response from black nationalist activists, who praised the armed men for their brave initiative, 
while receiving negative responses from inherently non-violent organizations such as the 
NAACP and the SCLC, who condemned the Deacons’ use of violence. But throughout the 
nation, the decreasing popularity of nonviolent submissive activism became visible. Among 
black activists, the sentiment of black self-protection and self-determination advanced into an 
emergence of the Black Power movement. As 1965 and 1966 were commencing, the full-
hearted nonviolent organizations, under the leadership of King, desperately tried to contain the 
militant influence of Black Power. But the ideology that revolved around black autonomy 
rooted in black civil rights activism, and consequently changed the civil rights movement.  
In 1968, Benjamin Muse wrote in his book that the Deacons’ philosophy was a harbinger 
of “a large element of impatient, sullen Negroes.” His description of the Deacons as simply 
impatient is problematic. The southern vacuum of desperation in which the Deacons were 
created, originated from centuries of violent suppression and the recent unwillingness of 
governmental institutions to provide protection under the Civil Rights Act of 1964. Above all, 
southern African Americans had been patient for a long time. Whether or not the movement’s 
shift towards black militancy was righteous or the most effective is a question to which this 
thesis does not have an answer, and is perhaps a matter of opinion. However, what can be said 
after thoroughly researching the Deacons as a civil rights organization is that the group of armed 
men certainly did not exist of a bunch of “sullen Negroes,” united only by the emerging 
ideology of Black Power. The Deacons were highly organized on a local level, portrayed a well-
formulated strategy of self-defense, and were successful in fulfilling their objectives of 
minimizing local Klan-violence. Hill even concludes his research by stating that sophisticated 
black political figures such as Robert F. Williams and Malcolm X all called for a broad self-
defense organization in the south, but failed in their efforts to develop such an organization. 
Whereas “a handful of working-class black men in Jonesboro found the Holy Grail.”135  
The Deacons for Defense and Justice were of indisputable importance for the 
development and improvement of safety in the black neighborhoods. They were indeed 
important and successful actors at a time when civil rights thought in the South was changing. 
For many black activists the Deacons were an example of brave manhood, and they became an 
inspiration for the expansion of black self-defensive organizing. For example, for Bobby Seale 
and Huey P. Newton’s formation of the Black Panther Party in 1966. However, describing the 
Deacons for Defense as the “Holy Grail” of broad self-defensive organizing is perhaps an 
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exaggeration. The Deacons were highly successful in decreasing the amount of Klan attacks 
and protecting civil rights activists in Jonesboro and Bogalusa, but were unable to establish a 
coherent organization on a national level. First of all, the Deacon leaders created a tendency of 
exaggerating numbers. When Sims and Thomas first claimed to have over 50 chapters and 5000 
members, the numbers already seemed exaggerated, and within months FBI research affirmed 
that these numbers were incorrect. The Deacon leaders’ obvious brags on a national platform 
did not help increase their popularity in the big cities, which became apparent when Thomas 
was confronted by aggravated citizens on the radio. 
When “Black Power” was thrown into the civil rights movement during the March 
Against Fear, the Deacons were present and played an important role, but the organization never 
truly fitted into the Black Power movement. They were not nonviolent, but they were no real 
militants either. The organization’s call for strictly defensive violence turned out not to be 
relevant enough for black activists outside of Louisiana. Moreover, the southern Deacons never 
intended to be a voice of revolution. Although several members and leaders certainly grew more 
radical over the years, they remained primarily focused on defense against vigilante violence 
from the Ku Klux Klan. The Deacons’ original strategy of self-defense worked out perfectly in 
Jonesboro and Bogalusa, but did not catch on beyond the rural South. The rural versus urban 
divide was too big for the Deacons to overcome. In the rural areas, the concepts of black 
autonomy and Black Power were embraced as part of a necessary strategy against vigilante 
terror. In the urban areas, the Black Power movement was embraced by Black Nationalist 
groups and morphed into a new form of black militancy, which was created in a vacuum of 
revolutionary thought. This displayed an immense contrast to the Deacons’ “simple” goals of 
eliminating Klan violence from southern black lives. Thomas overestimated the importance of 
defense against Klan-violence outside of rural Louisiana. The Deacons’ approach therefore 
never reached success in the big cities. 
As Klan violence declined in the rural Louisianan towns, the necessity of having the 
Deacons for Defense around for protection declined too. Few Deacon members shared Thomas’ 
determination of expansion, and the black southern men certainly did not share the northern 
militants’ revolutionary visions. By 1968 most of the southern Deacons agreed that their 
existence was no longer necessary. As a result, the Deacons for Defense and Justice only existed 
for short period of time during the most hectic years of the civil rights movement in the 1960s. 
In August of 1965, when the Deacons in Jonesboro were quite recently established, Thomas 
was asked about the future of the organization. The Deacons’ vice president replied:  
 
“We hope it won’t be necessary to have an organization such as the Deacons in the future. If 
we get the protection, we hopefully might be able to disband in a couple of years or sooner.”136  
 
Even though Earnest Thomas changed his mind along the way, his aspiration from August 1965 
became reality. The Deacons turned out to be a crucial factor for the expulsion of Klan-violence 
from rural towns such as Bogalusa and Jonesboro. However, the organization as a defensive 
necessity lost its purpose by the end of the decade, and faded into the background of increasing 
northern black militancy.  
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 This research has indicated the role that the Deacons for Defense played in the southern 
civil rights movement between 1964 and 1968, but in order to determine the exact influence the 
Deacons had on the metamorphosis of the national civil rights movement and the development 
of the Black Power ideology on a national scale, further research is necessary on black activist 
thought in the 1960s in relation to Southern black self-defense. Some historians have argued 
that the Deacons were part of the new era of violent self-defense, or even that the Deacons were 
the original agitators for a new sense of black self-determination throughout the nation, which 
instigated the creation of other black militant organizations. However, while narratives are 
being rediscovered, further research is necessary to discover the actual influence that small 
southern armed organizations such as the Deacons had on the development of large northern 
organizations such as the Black Panther Party.  
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